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As part of Russia’s ongoing foreign interference campaign, The Internet Research 
Agency (IRA) appropriated marginalised identities and created impersonated 
propaganda, including the Facebook groups LGBT United and United Muslims. Guided 
by critical theory and informed by feminist, queer, and postcolonial perspectives, this 
study examined 500 posts from LGBT United and 500 posts from United Muslims, to 
explore the groups’ content, purpose, and use of marginalised identities.  Qualitative 
content analysis revealed several themes, including (Attempted) Identity Theft (efforts to 
appear legitimate), A Call to Inaction (discouragement of political engagement), “Us” 
Against the World (encouraging isolation and anger), and That’s the Thing I’m Sensitive 
About! (potentially generating antagonism towards the marginalised community). 
Findings discuss the possibility that these posts are multitarget (intended to influence not 
only the impersonated community, but groups hostile to it), explore potential danger to 
marginalised groups, recommend consideration of proactive strategies, and encourage 
community partnership. 
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Chapter 1.  
 
Introduction 
The Internet Research Agency (IRA), an organisation linked to the Russian 
government, has struck fear into the hearts of many nations.  In the past few years, 
governments and researchers have rallied a great deal of analysis to understand, and 
fight against, the IRA’s political interference efforts and foreign influence campaign (e.g. 
Badawy et al., 2019; DiResta et al., 2018; Howard et al., 2019; Kim et al., 2018; Linvill et 
al., 2019; Lukito et al., 2019; McCombie et al., 2020; National Intelligence Council, 2017; 
Rodriguez, 2019; United States. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence, 
2019a).  Much existing research has focused upon the actions of the IRA in terms of 
right-wing groups, specifically their impersonation of right-wing individuals and creation 
of right-wing groups on social media.  However, IRA-controlled Facebook groups also 
impersonated and influenced marginalised communities and used marginalised identities 
to foment discord far beyond the 2016 US presidential election (DiResta et al., 2018b; 
Howard et al., 2019; Lukito, 2020). 
According to Howard et al. (2019), 85% of adult Americans use the internet 
regularly, and 80% of those people are Facebook users. Social media, such as 
Facebook, is a source of news and more general information for many.  While 
marginalised groups have used social media to create communities of support and 
activism, foreign actors have seen the opportunities these social media communities 
present, misrepresenting and harming marginalised groups as they go (Cavalcante, 
2019; Islam, 2019; Lukito, 2020).  
Impersonated (or ‘black’) propaganda is “presented by the propagandizer as 
coming from a source inside the propagandized” (Becker, 1949, p. 221; Farkas et al., 
2018a).  The IRA used impersonated propaganda in its efforts to influence foreign 
politics, including the 2016 American presidential election, creating social media groups 
which alleged to represent marginalised communities (Bastos & Farkas, 2019; Keller et 
al., 2020; Lukito, 2020).  The purpose and uses of these groups purporting to be 
marginalised communities may be more complex than is typically presumed.   
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The IRA put significant effort into these social media accounts, in the form of 
manpower, man hours, and money.  Advertisements targeted to marginalised groups 
were among the costliest, with the greatest expenditure by the IRA. These groups were 
also amongst the top accumulators of likes and general interactions (DiResta et al., 
2018b; Howard et al., 2019; United States v. Internet Research Agency LLC, 2018). It is 
likely, therefore, that these groups served a purpose, and were seen as a valuable part 
of the IRA’s overall strategies. To better understand the purpose of these groups, it is 
necessary to conduct an in-depth exploration of what these groups posted, what they 
were attempting to achieve, and how marginalised identities related to these efforts.  
1.1. The threat 
Nations have long committed campaigns of foreign interference.  Russia has an 
extensive history of interfering in the United States, and the United States has an 
extensive history of interfering in Russia (DiResta et al., 2018b; T. Jones, 2019; Ziegler, 
2018).  The IRA uses old and new methods to take advantage of the unique milieu of 
social media; their actions pose a severe threat to democracies worldwide, and may 
endanger the concept of democracy itself (DiResta et al., 2018b; Howard et al., 2019; 
Lukito, 2020; National Intelligence Council, 2017; Rodriguez, 2019; Ziegler, 2018).   
Most attention has focused on Russian interference in the American presidential 
election of 2016.  However, the IRA has acted and seen success in numerous nations, 
including its own.  Nowhere is truly safe, with evidence of IRA interference in the 
Ukraine, the United Kingdom, Canada, France, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, and 
other nations (Dawson & Innes, 2019; Paul & Matthews, 2016; Ziegler, 2018).  
Successes, such as the election of their preferred candidate, Donald Trump, may drive 
the IRA to continue and expand their campaign, sophisticating their methods to even 
greater effectiveness (DiResta et al., 2018; Kim et al., 2018; United States. Congress. 
Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence, 2019). 
According to the report of the National Intelligence Council (2017), “Russian 
media hailed President-elect Trump’s victory as a vindication of Putin’s advocacy of 
global populist movements…and the latest example of Western liberalism’s collapse” (p. 
ii).  The rise of populism and authoritarian rule is both a source of pleasure for Russia 
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and a goal they actively work towards (Bastos & Farkas, 2019).  This encouragement of 
authoritarianism, and attack on liberal democracy, presents a powerful threat. 
The threat is not a temporary one.  Elections are “merely a small subset” of the 
IRA’s overall campaign to create massive political and social discord (DiResta et al., 
2018, p. 11). It is not only governments and political systems which are under attack: the 
IRA weaponizes citizens against each other, purposefully manipulating long-standing 
issues and prejudices, while creating new conspiracies (Badawy et al., 2019; DiResta et 
al., 2018; Howard et al., 2019; Whitehead et al., 2018).    
The IRA’s actions intend to stoke hate and discord, and indeed to directly incite 
violence (DiResta et al., 2018b). Marginalised groups, in particular, are in danger, as the 
IRA’s methods involve encouragement and fomenting of hatred against marginalised 
groups, using that hatred to drive attacks on democracy as a whole.  Marginalised 
identities are key to fuel conflict and animosity (DiResta et al., 2018b; Howard et al., 
2019; Kim et al., 2018).  At the same time, the IRA attempts to ensure the election of 
governments who are hostile to these marginalised groups and will pass harmful laws, 
and encourage hateful rhetoric (Blair, 2017; Whitehead et al., 2018; Ziegler, 2018).   
 The IRA purposefully works to increase division and violence, and decrease 
trust in potential sources of truth or refutation like the media  (Howard et al., 2019; Linvill 
et al., 2019).  They also try to erode trust in the government, especially amongst 
marginalised people, literally eroding faith in democracy while mobilizing chaos (DiResta 
et al., 2018b).  The IRA’s actions create a climate which is hostile to the success of 
democracy, and places marginalised people in danger.  
1.2. Relevance to criminology 
The IRA leverages prejudices and stereotypes about marginalised groups; many 
of these stereotypes include supposed violent tendencies, actions, or a predisposition to 
commit crime (Howard et al., 2019).  When impersonating the right-wing, the IRA talks 
about Muslims as terrorists, queer people (especially transgender individuals) as 
rapists/pedophiles, and Black Americans and irregular immigrants as criminals (Blair, 
2017; DiResta et al., 2018b; Heiskanen, 2017; T. Jones, 2019; United States. Congress. 
Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence, 2019b).  Criminology itself must reflect on its 
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role in supporting and propagating these stereotypes, in how we write and teach, and in 
our research focus (Arrigo & Bersot, 2015; Ball et al., 2014).   
When impersonating marginalised groups, the IRA emphasises issues that are 
far more legitimate.  They present true stories of homophobic, transphobic, and 
Islamophobic hate crimes, discuss police brutality and the role of the criminal justice 
system in oppression, and present examples of misuse of the law as a tool of 
discrimination (DiResta et al., 2018b, 2018a; Howard et al., 2019; Kim, 2018).  All of 
these issues concern criminology (Belknap, 2015).  
In addition, criminology should be very concerned with the outcome the IRA 
desires: discord and, potentially, violence (Howard et al., 2019; Lukito et al., 2020).  
Criminologists may be concerned that the IRA’s actions - inflaming prejudice and 
spreading conspiracy theories - could have an effect on crime rates, especially as 
marginalised groups are vulnerable to becoming victims of violence (Awan & Zempi, 
2015; Chakraborti & Zempi, 2012; Kondakov, 2019).  Criminologists could also create 
beneficial research by looking at the actions of the IRA with specific theories and 
paradigms, such as in terms of the process of incitement to violence, and radicalisation 
(Benkler et al., 2018; Devine, 2017; DiResta et al., 2018b).  There are also questions 
about the IRA’s actions and how they fit within international law (Rodriguez, 2019). 
We must also beware of academia being used for nefarious purposes, seeing the 
danger of publicising questionable research to support questionable points, as previous 
Russian propaganda and interference campaigns have featured Russians posing as 
academics themselves (T. Jones, 2019).  Russia has a history of planting academic 
articles in scholarly journals – using scholarly publications to influence not just public, but 
academic thought, while using academia as an arena for creating ‘legitimate’ support 
(Boghardt, 2009; T. Jones, 2019).  As many marginalised academics can attest, it is 
difficult, already, to have a voice in academia, and to create research that challenges 
prevailing narratives (Tuhiwai-Smith, 2012).  How much more so, how much more 
disheartening, to have this field open to, and used by, political actors who wish them 
harm? 
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1.3. The current study 
1.3.1. LGBT United and United Muslims: IRA-controlled 
This study examines organic posts from two IRA-controlled marginalised-
impersonating Facebook groups, LGBT United and United Muslims.  There is substantial 
evidence that these groups were created and controlled by the IRA.  Facebook included 
LGBT United and United Muslims on its list of IRA-created Facebook groups, which was 
submitted to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, as part of that Committee’s 
investigation into IRA activity (United States. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on 
Intelligence, 2019b).   
This identification is confirmed by various links, paper trails, testimony, and 
documentation (Howard et al., 2019; United States v. Internet Research Agency LLC, 
2018).  For instance, Facebook identified patterns in advertisement purchases by many 
IRA-controlled groups.  Despite claiming to be based in the United States, many of these 
groups paid in Rubles, had Russian internet addresses (or even Russian physical 
addresses), and used falsified information on PayPal to complete the purchases (T. 
Jones, 2019; United States. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence, 
2019b; United States v. Internet Research Agency LLC, 2018).  These payments appear 
in budgets submitted to Concord Catering, the company that provided the IRA with 
significant funding (United States v. Internet Research Agency LLC, 2018).   
The interlinked nature of the assorted IRA-controlled social media accounts, 
which stretched across platforms, provided evidence in the form of repeatedly-used e-
mail addresses, names, and other tell-tale features (United States. Congress. Senate. 
Select Committee on Intelligence, 2019b).  The IRA left a paper trail while creating 
various events, such as rallies and protests, on American soil; United Muslims, for 
instance, paid a person to hold a sign for an advertisement, as well as ordering posters 
to be printed for a rally (United States v. Internet Research Agency LLC, 2018).  In 
addition, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence relied on evidence obtained from 
within the IRA itself, such as internal memoranda, e-mails, and statements from former 
IRA employees (United States. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence, 
2019b).  The evidence reliably demonstrates that United Muslims and LGBT United were 
operated by the IRA.   
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1.3.2. Research questions 
The current study seeks to describe, analyze, explain, and give insight into the 
methods used by the IRA’s marginalised-impersonating groups, and the messages they 
contain.  The aim of this study is to explore and describe the content of the IRA 
Facebook pages that impersonated marginalised communities, namely the queer and 
Muslim communities, and to investigate the purposes and potential impacts of this 
content, uncovering latent meaning and complexities.  The research questions are: 
1) What does the content of LGBT United and United Muslims look like? 
2) What were the messages in this content? 






Chapter 2.  
 
Literature Review 
This chapter begins with discussion of the queer and Muslim communities as 
groups who are marginalised within Western society, as well as the circumstances and 
vulnerabilities this position creates.  Then, it addresses the ways in which these groups 
use social media, and the unique role social media plays as a place of community, 
safety, and activism.  Subsequently, it presents the situation of queer and Muslim 
communities within Russia, considering the ways in which this informs Russia’s view of 
these groups, and Russia’s experience in manipulating these groups for political 
purposes.  Then, the chapter provides information about the IRA, looking at studies that 
describe the IRA’s origin, methods, purpose, and impact.  The chapter closes with a 
delineation of gaps in the literature.   
2.1. Muslim and queer communities as marginalised 
groups  
“Marginalization—a complex, relational, and contextual phenomenon—is an 
outcome of ideological and structural oppression wherein certain identity groups and 
their respective interests are relegated to the margins of political and public spheres” 
(Coe & Griffin, 2020, p. 2).  Both the queer and Muslim communities are considered to 
be marginalised, experiencing oppression, inequality, discrimination, and, frequently, 
victimisation (Coe & Griffin, 2020; Tuhiwai Smith, 2012).  This marginalisation makes 
them uniquely vulnerable to exploitation and harm.  In both groups, people of colour face 
the greatest levels of prejudice, fear, and violence (Karaman & Christian, 2020; Kaufman 
& Niner, 2019; Lucero, 2017; Patel, 2017; Ramirez et al., 2018). 
There are 1.6 billion Muslims worldwide, and 1.1% of Americans are Muslim; this 
community is vast and heterogeneous, including racially.  Islam cannot be considered 
simply as a religion or ideology; it is also “an intersection of culture, ethnicity, and 
religion” (Rahman & Valliani, 2016, p. 80).  Therefore, Islamophobia is often discussed in 
terms of racialization of religion, wherein “a group of religious people become associated 
with phenotypical and cultural characteristics that are deemed unchanging and 
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hereditary” (Kaufman & Niner, 2019, p. 490).  Islamophobia, in this view, is sometimes 
described as racism against Muslims (Garner & Selod, 2015; Karaman & Christian, 
2020). 
“In the twenty-first century, Muslim has become synonymous with terrorist in 
media…political…and public discourse in the US” (Kaufman & Niner, 2019, p. 490).  
While blatant, government encouraged Islamophobia, and Islamophobic hate crimes and 
violence rose after 9/11, the tropes of Islamophobia have existed as part of Western 
Christian beliefs since before the Crusades, serving as justification for invasion, 
violence, and discrimination (Hafez, 2020; Kaufman & Niner, 2019).  Muslims have been 
framed as a common enemy, a scapegoat and a means for Western nations to appeal 
for solidarity (Brayson, 2019; Crosby, 2014; Hafez, 2014; Winnick, 2019).  These beliefs 
ascribe characteristics to Muslims, framing them as inherently different, inherently 
inferior, incompatible with Western values, violent, misogynistic, and dangerous (Garner 
& Selod, 2015; Hafez, 2014; Kaufman & Niner, 2019).   
It is incredibly difficult to estimate the worldwide queer population, and while this 
does partially relate to issues of definitions and methodology, it might also largely come 
down to a more upsetting reason: for most people, it may simply be too dangerous to 
admit being queer (Kondakov, 2019; Pachankis & Bränström, 2019; Soboleva & 
Bakhmetjev, 2015).  Pachankis & Bränström (2019) estimate that up to 83% of the 
global queer community may be ‘in the closet’, concealing their identity.   
With the addition of the aforementioned challenges relating to how exactly 
researchers define or determine membership in the queer community, few concrete 
numbers are found (Borgogna et al., 2019; Carrotte et al., 2016; M. G. F. Worthen, 
2020).  As an example, a 2017 Gallup Poll asked the question, “Do you, personally, 
identify as lesbian, gay, bisexual or transgender?”, which means their results may not 
include potential members of the queer community who identify as pansexual, asexual, 
nonbinary, queer, et cetera (Carrotte et al., 2016; Gates, 2017; M. G. F. Worthen, 2020).  
Additionally, asking about self-identification (how someone labels their own sexuality or 
gender identity) creates different results than if questions specifically ask about 
behaviour or attraction: for instance, Gates (2011) found that 11% of Americans have 
experienced same-sex attraction, though only 3.5% of American adults identified as 
lesbian, gay, or bisexual (Borgogna et al., 2019; Gates, 2011). 
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The queer community, like the Muslim community, is both marginalised and 
heterogenous (Belfort, 2017; Cavalcante, 2019; Lucero, 2017; Tamimi Arab & Suhonic, 
2017; Whitehead & Perry, 2015).  Individuals experience this marginalisation in different 
ways, with intersecting identities – not only their gender or sexual orientation, but also 
characteristics such as race, religion, disability, immigration status, socioeconomic 
status, or occupation - affecting their experiences and the prejudice they experience 
(Cavalcante, 2019; Jenzen, 2017; Lucero, 2017; Meyer, 2020; Patel, 2017; Travers et 
al., 2020).  Transgender individuals, in particular, are highly marginalised and subjected 
to intense prejudice and violence (Patel, 2017; Spencer, 2019; Travers et al., 2020).   
Queer individuals frequently experience discrimination, both interpersonal and 
societal (Fisher et al., 2017; Harmer & Lumsden, 2019; Jenzen & Karl, 2014; Travers et 
al., 2020).  Members of the community describe suffering homophobic and/or 
transphobic violence, and facing abandonment and trauma (such as being disowned by 
family), as well as higher rates of mental illness, suicidality, poverty, homelessness, 
harassment in the school and workplace, and legalised discrimination (Dessel & 
Rodenborg, 2017; Gal et al., 2016; Jenzen & Karl, 2014; Liang et al., 2019; Murib, 2019; 
Patel, 2017; Travers et al., 2020). 
2.1.1. White evangelical conservative Christians 
Effective consideration and nuanced contextual analysis of propaganda that 
impersonates marginalised communities, such as that found in LGBT United and United 
Muslims, requires consideration of another societal group – evangelical Christians, 
specifically white evangelical Christians.  This group features a conjunction of race, 
religion, affiliation, and political loyalty (Gorski, 2017; Johnston, 2016).  They also have a 
very important outlook on, and relationship to, these two marginalised communities, and 
therefore potentially to the IRA (Johnston, 2016; Kuruvilla, 2017; Wolff et al., 2012). 
A notable similarity between the Muslim and queer communities: these are two 
identities which white evangelical conservative Christians may feel it is acceptable to 
have active, outspoken hostility towards (Castle, 2019; Glass, 2019; Johnston, 2016; 
Whitehead et al., 2018).  Evangelical Christians may view these groups’ very existence 
as a threat, and their mere presence as an assault on Christianity and an affront to God 
(Colliver et al., 2019; Johnston, 2016).   
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Evangelical Christians are the largest religious group in the United States, 
comprising one-third of Americans, and are recognised as Donald Trump’s primary base 
of support (Kurtzleben, 2015; Kuruvilla, 2017).  Evangelicals “constitute a distinct sector 
of Christianity known for their social and political influence and … share a core set of 
beliefs as a group” (Kanamori et al., 2017, p. 77).  Specifically, evangelical Christianity is 
known for combining religion and politics (Gorski, 2017; Johnston, 2016; Kurtzleben, 
2015).   
Evangelical Christianity is difficult to define, leading many studies to simply ask 
participants to self-identify as evangelical (Kanamori et al., 2017; Wolff et al., 2012).  
However, the National Association of Evangelicals purposefully worked with LifeWay 
Research to create a set of four statements an evangelical would strongly agree with, to 
be used for academic purposes: 
• The Bible is the highest authority for what I believe. 
• It is very important for me personally to encourage non-Christians 
to trust Jesus Christ as their Savior 
• Jesus Christ’s death on the cross is the only sacrifice that could 
remove the penalty of my sin 
• Only those who trust in Jesus Christ alone as their Savior receive 
God’s free gift of eternal salvation. (National Association of 
Evangelicals & LifeWay Research, 2015, p. 1) 
These characteristics - especially the supremacy of the Bible, and the drive to convert 
others to Christianity - are relevant not only to evangelicals’ religious beliefs, but to their 
political actions, (Gorski, 2017; Johnston, 2016; Todd et al., 2020). 
Race is an essential issue to consider, not just religion.  While evangelical 
Christianity as a whole cannot be seen as intrinsically conservative – in fact, most Black 
evangelicals vote Democrat - white evangelical Christianity can be seen as intrinsically 
conservative (Glass, 2019; Gorski, 2017; Kuruvilla, 2017).  White evangelicals are the 
most likely group to feel negatively towards both the queer and Muslim communities (M. 
Campbell et al., 2019; Sherkat & Lehman, 2018). White conservative Christianity is, 
according to Glass (2019), the “central cleavage in contemporary American political and 
social life” (p. 9).  Amongst all religious groups in the United States, white conservative 
evangelical Christians hold the most negative attitudes towards queer people, 
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immigrants and refugees, and a very strong and specific dislike of Islam (D. Cox et al., 
2017; Kuruvilla, 2017; Sherkat & Lehman, 2018; Whitehead et al., 2018).   
Only 34% of white evangelicals believe homosexuality should be accepted in 
society (in comparison, 52% of Muslims believe homosexuality should be accepted in 
society) (Kuruvilla, 2017).  Being Christian, especially being a white evangelical 
Christian, significantly increases the likelihood of holding negative attitudes and 
prejudices regarding the queer community (e.g. M. Campbell et al., 2019; Castle, 2019; 
Fisher et al., 2017; Lewis et al., 2017; Todd et al., 2020; Wolff et al., 2012).  
Transgender people are viewed even more negatively than other members of the queer 
community; many evangelicals see transgender people as opposing God and his divine 
will (Colliver et al., 2019).   
Many of these beliefs seem to be linked to the concept of Christian hegemony – 
the belief that the US should be Christian, and Christians should be in power.  The queer 
and Muslim communities are seen as a threat to this power (Rana, 2007; Todd et al., 
2020).  With the combination of white evangelical tendency to have negative feelings 
towards marginalised communities, and evangelicals’ recognised political importance, 
especially as supporters of Trump, this group may serve as a ready target for 
propaganda, particularly propaganda that revolves around the queer and Muslim 
communities (Gorski, 2017; Whitehead et al., 2018). 
2.2. Marginalised people on social media 
Marginalised groups have a unique relationship to social media, and may be 
particularly vulnerable, and particularly affected, by online interference campaigns.  For 
many marginalised individuals, online communities hold a recognised role as spaces not 
only of community and identity, but of support, safety, and trust (e.g. Bahfen, 2018; 
Cavalcante, 2019; Eckert et al., 2019; Escobar-Viera et al., 2020; Islam, 2019; Lucero, 
2017; McConnell et al., 2017; Wills & Fecteau, 2016).  By assuming that existing role, 
and taking advantage of the trust associated with it, the IRA and other interference 
campaigns have the potential to wield a great deal of power with limited effort (DiResta 
et al., 2018b; Howard et al., 2019). 
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Social media is a useful, sometimes even vital, platform and tool for marginalised 
individuals, as a place where their voices can be heard, and they can find a community 
(Bahfen, 2018; Gal et al., 2016; Lucero, 2017; Pennington, 2018).  “New participatory 
digital technologies have facilitated a dramatic shift in minorities’ accessibility to public 
discourse. In recent decades, virtual public spaces have become significant sites for 
collective identity formation” (Gal et al., 2016, p. 1700).  This significance differentiates 
the IRA social media accounts which impersonated right-wing, dominant groups from 
those which impersonated marginalised groups: social media has a higher degree of 
importance, and a larger part to play, in the lives of marginalised individuals 
(Andreassen, 2017; Downing, 2013; McConnell et al., 2017). 
The internet, as a place of interaction and discourse, provides a feasible venue 
for activism as well as simple, unhidden existence for those who are not in a dominant 
position in society (McKenna & Chughtai, 2020). For marginalised groups, social media - 
and their presence and activism on social media - is a source of power, and a means of 
building and leveraging that power (Gal et al., 2016; Vivienne & Burgess, 2012; Yukich, 
2018).  Therefore, in targeting marginalised groups via social media, and on social 
media, imitating those same social media communities that serve as places of identity 
and safety, the IRA impinges upon the power and agency of these communities as a 
whole - the IRA commits a further sin. 
2.2.1. Use of social media by the queer community 
Social media holds a unique place and importance in queer culture, as a safe 
space (Craig & McInroy, 2014; Lucero, 2017).  These online communities are sometimes 
the only environments where queer individuals feel they can be themselves, especially if 
they are from a family, or location, where being queer is socially unacceptable, or even 
dangerous (Escobar-Viera et al., 2020; Jenzen, 2017).  Social media is often where 
young people first find the wider queer community, and it serves as a venue for 
exploration, identity-formation, and information (Cavalcante, 2019; McInroy et al., 2019).  
Online queer communities are places of trust and vulnerability, with a presumption of 
safety not often found in LGBT individuals’ ‘real’ lives (Cavalcante, 2019; Liang et al., 
2019; Lucero, 2017).  The trust these communities hold could be powerful if exploited. 
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As a population whose existence is inherently political, online queer communities 
are also places for activism (Jenzen, 2017; Vivienne & Burgess, 2012).  Social media 
groups create a mass of individuals who can inform one another and act together, 
wielding collective power; activism might include laws to protest, petitions to sign, and 
information about candidates who oppose or support the community as a whole 
(McConnell et al., 2017; McKenna & Chughtai, 2020).  Activism, and politics, are an 
essential feature of queer social media communities. 
2.2.2. Use of social media by the Muslim community 
On social media, Muslim users can create a safe place to exist, explore their 
identity, and create community with people who share culture and experiences (Eckert et 
al., 2019; Pennington, 2018; Wills & Fecteau, 2016).  While social media is still full of 
Islamophobia, users can create ‘Muslim-friendly’ spaces through curation via choosing 
who to friend or follow (Eckert et al., 2019; Pennington, 2018).  It is also a place of 
humour, and enjoyment of participating in fandom as part of communities for fans of 
particular media (Bahfen, 2018; Pennington, 2018).   
For many, social media is a platform for discussions with Muslims and non-
Muslims, creating opportunities for educating, engaging, and showing an alternate Islam, 
one that contradicts the dominant stereotypes (Downing & Dron, 2020; Eckert et al., 
2019; Midden & Ponzanesi, 2013; Pennington, 2018).  It also facilitates discussion of 
intra-community issues which some may be reluctant to discuss elsewhere, due to the 
knowledge of how this discussion might be seen and used by Islamophobes to justify 
prejudice (Bahfen, 2018; Midden & Ponzanesi, 2013; Wills & Fecteau, 2016).  Even on 
social media many Muslim users describe the constant pressure to show and maintain a 
positive image (Downing & Dron, 2020; Eckert et al., 2019; Midden & Ponzanesi, 2013; 
Pennington, 2018).   
Social media cultivates a feeling of agency, and of having a voice (Bahfen, 2018; 
Downing & Dron, 2020; Eckert et al., 2019).  This often becomes action - challenging, 
correcting, and fighting Islamophobia and its rhetoric, without the immediate threat to 
physical safety.  Muslims use social media’s connectivity, and efficiency to take political 
action, from organising protests of the Muslim Ban (an executive order that restricted 
entry into the Untied States for people from seven majority Muslim countries) to 
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spreading recordings of injustices like videos of police brutality, to standing in solidarity 
and fighting against fake news (Alimahomed-Wilson, 2020; Downing & Dron, 2020; 
Eckert et al., 2019; Midden & Ponzanesi, 2013; Pennington, 2018).  Overall, social 
media is very important, as a place of action, safety, community, identity, support, and 
trust, as well as organisation and political action (Bahfen, 2018; Eckert et al., 2019; 
Midden & Ponzanesi, 2013; Wills & Fecteau, 2016).   
2.3. Queer and Muslim communities in Russia 
In the past decades, as Russian nationalism and conservativism have grown, so 
too has homophobia.  In 2013, the Russian government passed anti-gay propaganda 
laws, vaguely worded and broadly applied statutes targeting queer groups and 
individuals (Buyantueva, 2018; Kondakov, 2019).  This homophobia has not limited itself 
to laws: numerous queer people have been attacked and murdered, and others are 
targeted by criminal groups seeking to commit blackmail (Kondakov, 2019; Soboleva & 
Bakhmetjev, 2015). Visible queerness is aggressively suppressed, and open or even 
accessible discussion of queer issues or culture is largely silenced (Buyantueva, 2017). 
In such a situation, IRA employees are unlikely to be personally familiar with how to 
convincingly play a queer person – instead, they appear to have turned to researching 
and subsequently impersonating real online queer communities (Lukito, 2020; United 
States v. Internet Research Agency LLC, 2018). 
This Russian homophobia is not to be mistaken for simple conservatism: it is also 
very deliberately wielded for political purposes.  Queer people are a handy example to 
point to as demonstrating negative Western cultural influence (Buyantueva, 2018; 
Suchland, 2018).  Opposition to queer rights is used to define and reinforce Russian 
national identity in terms of defiance, difference, and moral superiority to the West 
(Soboleva & Bakhmetjev, 2015; Suchland, 2018).  Being opposed to queer rights is 
framed as patriotic, standing up against Western imperialism, while support for queer 
rights is framed as unpatriotic (Buyantueva, 2018; Soboleva & Bakhmetjev, 2015).  In 
the same way as American evangelical conservative Christianity has amalgamated 
conservativism and nationalism with religion, Russia has amalgamated homophobia and 
conservatism with patriotism (Gorski, 2017; Soboleva & Bakhmetjev, 2015; Suchland, 
2018).  
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Russia’s treatment of Muslims is more subtle, lacking such blatantly antagonistic 
laws (Aitamurto, 2016; Müller, 2019).  The government has sometimes used the 
supposed lack of Islamophobia as a point of pride, separating itself from the 
‘Islamophobic West’ (Simons, 2019).  Russia presents a positive face, supporting and 
sponsoring Muslim community projects (Akhmetkarimov, 2019).  President Vladimir 
Putin even ceremonially inaugurated a new mosque, magnanimously declaring that 
Islam is an indigenous Russian religion.  Nonetheless, his speech also insisted on 
linking Muslims with terrorism, emphasising the role Russia’s ‘traditional Islam’ must play 
in the fight against Islamic extremism (Müller, 2019).   
This is the key phrase: traditional Islam.  While theoretically permitted and even 
protected by the government, Russian Islam is tightly constrained (Aitamurto, 2016; 
Akhmetkarimov, 2019).  Islam in Russia is completely controlled by the government, 
which only permits the practice of ‘traditional Islam’ – anything else, deemed ‘non-
traditional’, is forbidden.  What, exactly, traditional Islam consists of is unclear: the 
flexible definition is used to crack down on opponents, ban books, shut down 
organisations, and suppress attempts at independence (Aitamurto, 2019; 
Akhmetkarimov, 2019; Ragozina, 2020). 
Some of the ‘gist’ behind traditional Islam focuses around nationalism; complete 
loyalty to Russia must come before loyalty to religion or religious community (Aitamurto, 
2016; Akhmetkarimov, 2019). Traditional Islam also insist upon generally conservative 
views – for instance, so-called traditional family values (Müller, 2019; Ragozina, 2020).   
Traditional Islam demands complete adherence to the government-created religious 
bureaucratic hierarchies, obedience to government-appointed religious leaders, and 
education by government-approved Islamic scholars (in government-created schools, 
with a government-guided curriculum) (Aitamurto, 2019; Akhmetkarimov, 2019; Müller, 
2019).  Essentially, the government also forbids Russian Muslims to connect with the 
multinational, worldwide Muslim community, as any external influence is viewed as a 
threat to Russian nationalism (Akhmetkarimov, 2019; Hunter, 2004; Ragozina, 2020). 
Indeed, despite this official permission (and tight control), Islam itself is viewed as 
a threat, with repetition of familiar tropes of Muslims as terrorists, disloyal, opponents to 
Christianity, and embodying ‘the other’.  Modern construing of Muslims as terrorists does 
not claim to stem from 9/11, however, but from attacks on Russian soil, as well as 
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actions by Chechen separatists (Ragozina, 2020; Vlaeminck, 2019).  This history 
stretches back farther, with Russia as a conqueror of Islamic states.  Russia has long 
viewed itself as a bulwark, defending Christianity – and Christendom – from the Islamic 
East.  Muslims have long been used as a national ‘other’.  Muslims in Russia were 
harshly treated, especially in the USSR with its state atheism, wherein government 
discouraged, and sometimes forbade, citizens from religious affiliation or practices 
(Akhmetkarimov, 2019; Hunter, 2004; Vicini, 2020).  After a brief period of relative 
freedom following the fall of the Iron Curtain, the Russian government once again 
implemented intense control, while using their laws as an excuse to avoid accusations of 
Islamophobia (Aitamurto, 2016; Akhmetkarimov, 2019).  This is an old and effective 
Russian method. 
Muslim Russians have a long history of struggling for survival and self-
determination, and live, now, theoretically tolerated yet with little political power.  
Additionally, the government – and non-Muslim Russians – have been pushing back 
against even this toleration; this pushback can be seen in arguments against hijabs 
being permitted in schools, along with fewer mosque permits being issued, and the 
increasing power of the Russian Orthodox Church (Aitamurto, 2016, 2019; Ragozina, 
2020).  Islam is viewed as “threatening to Russia’s cultural integrity and authenticity” 
(Hunter, 2004, p. 420).  This supposed threat, and Russia’s insistence that such control 
is necessary to prevent extremism, are used as a justification for violence, both domestic 
and military (Aitamurto, 2019; Ragozina, 2020). 
2.3.1. Russian propaganda use of these communities 
For decades, Russia has deployed international propaganda which focused on 
marginalised groups, including LGBT people, stirring dissent and political discord by 
exploiting and inflaming homophobic sentiments, then purposefully pitting this 
homophobia against the struggle for queer rights (T. Jones, 2019).  Exploration of this 
history is essential to understand the full depth of the IRA’s methods, which involve 
leveraging marginalised identities (DiResta et al., 2018b; Howard et al., 2019; Lukito et 
al., 2020).   
In 1997, for instance, sociologist Alexandr Dugin, discussed the importance of 
“introduc[ing] geopolitical disorder into internal American activity, encouraging all kinds 
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of separatism – ethnic, social and racial conflicts, actively supporting all dissident 
movements – extremist, racist and sectarian groups, thus destabilizing internal political 
processes in the US” (Dugin, 1997, p. 367, as cited in T. Jones, 2019, p. 5).  He also 
pointed out a key finding of this study: the specific focus on conservative Christians, as 
queer rights are something “about which religious conservatives can become incensed” 
(Dugin, 1997, p. 367, as cited in T. Jones, 2019, p. 5).  
 Russian propaganda and interference campaigns have also involved exploitation 
of feelings and activism around Muslims and Islamophobia.  Often this consisted of 
continual representation of Muslims as a threat to Russian safety and culture (Hunter, 
2004; Ragozina, 2020).  However, it also sometimes involved positioning Russia as a 
religiously tolerant nation which respects Islam, in theoretical contrast to the 
Islamophobic West (Simons, 2019). 
For Russian operations, it was logical and valuable to restrict and oppose rights 
within Russia, while creating propaganda that supported them elsewhere, and vice versa 
(T. Jones, 2019; Kondakov, 2019; Soboleva & Bakhmetjev, 2015).  Such a dichotomy 
serves to create a strong feeling of ‘us vs. them’, uniting Russians against a common 
enemy, painting Russia as standing strong against a decadent, immoral West 
(Buyantueva, 2018; Suchland, 2018).   
2.4. The Internet Research Agency 
The founder of the Internet Research Agency (IRA), Yevgeniy Prigozhin, is 
known as a close associate of Russian president Vladimir Putin; despite appeals to 
plausible deniability, the IRA is assumed to operate under the auspices of the Russian 
government (McCombie et al., 2020; United States. Congress. Senate. Select 
Committee on Intelligence, 2019b).  In the beginning, after its official incorporation as a 
company in 2013, the IRA mostly focused on operations and propaganda campaigns 
within Russia and in nearby countries.  However, they quickly turned their eyes, and 
expertise, to the United States (Howard et al., 2019; Lukito, 2020; McCombie et al., 
2020).   
Though it ran multiple campaigns, the IRA put a great deal of effort and attention 
into its ‘translator project’, which operated accounts on social media for the purpose of 
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political interference and information warfare, via impersonated propaganda (Farkas & 
Neumayer, 2020; Howard et al., 2019; United States v. Internet Research Agency LLC, 
2018).  Impersonated propaganda (also known as ‘black’ propaganda), is described by 
Farkas et al. (2018) as disguising its actual source, instead being “presented by the 
propagandizer as coming from a source inside the propagandized” (Becker, 1949, p. 
221).   
Hundreds of IRA employees worked around the clock, creating and operating 
social media accounts that claimed to belong to Americans, especially American 
activists (McCombie et al., 2020).  The IRA researched real United States social media 
accounts, and even contacted genuine American activists for advice, posing as fellow 
American activists (United States v. Internet Research Agency LLC, 2018).  These 
specialists ran multiple social media accounts across a plethora of social media 
platforms, including Facebook.  Through these accounts, the IRA attempted to 
convincingly play the part of American people and groups, to gain followers and 
influence, to amplify their impact, and to emphasise divisive social issues while 
spreading disinformation (Badawy et al., 2019; DiResta et al., 2018b; Howard et al., 
2019; McCombie et al., 2020; Xia et al., 2019).   
Supervisors monitored employees’ performance and output, giving feedback and 
instructions telling them what topics to post that day, what issues to emphasise, and 
even offering potential phrasing.  These accounts were set up with different focuses and 
aims, impersonating people belonging to various communities within the US, and places 
on the political spectrum (Bastos & Farkas, 2019; DiResta et al., 2018b; Linvill et al., 
2019).  Posts often focused on known issues and divisions within the US.  The IRA’s 
primary goal was identified as the election of Donald Trump, however, their efforts 
continued and, in some cases, expanded, after the election (Kim, 2018; Rodriguez, 
2019).  Their overarching aim can be seen as fomenting political dissent, encouraging 
nationalistic populism, and weakening democracy (United States v. Internet Research 
Agency LLC, 2018; Ziegler, 2018). 
Numerous studies – governmental, academic, or both – have investigated the 
social media accounts run by the IRA , exploring this attempt to influence American 
politics and society (e.g. Badawy et al., 2019; Bastos & Farkas, 2019; DiResta et al., 
2018; Howard et al., 2019; Kim et al., 2018; Linvill et al., 2019; Lukito, 2020; Lukito et al., 
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2019; McCombie et al., 2020; United States. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on 
Intelligence, 2019a; United States v. Internet Research Agency LLC, 2018; Xia et al., 
2019, etc.).  Research has so far focused on uncovering the origin and practices of the 
IRA, as well undertaking a broad examination of methods, nature, and themes relating to 
the purposes of these social media accounts.  Studies have looked at ads, as well as 
organic content (that is, the actual posts posted in the group), as well as metadata 
provided to the government by social media companies like Facebook, Instagram, and 
Twitter (DiResta et al., 2018b; Howard et al., 2019; United States. Congress. Senate. 
Select Committee on Intelligence, 2019b).   
Largely, some common themes and findings have emerged, relating to the IRA’s 
goals and methods.  The Internet Research Agency undertook “a sweeping and 
sustained social influence operation consisting of various coordinated disinformation 
tactics aimed directly at US citizens, designed to exert political influence and exacerbate 
social divisions in US culture” (DiResta et al., 2018, p. 4).   
Topics emphasised on so-called left-impersonating groups included feelings of 
anger and fear around existing issues of violence and harm (DiResta et al., 2018b; 
Howard et al., 2019).  For instance, Black-impersonating groups emphasised police 
brutality, Muslim-impersonating groups emphasised Islamophobia, and queer-
impersonating groups emphasised homophobia and transphobia (DiResta et al., 2018b; 
Howard et al., 2019; National Intelligence Council, 2017; United States. Congress. 
Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence, 2019b).  By 2016, some of these groups had 
hundreds of thousands of followers, with their content and memes spread widely across 
the internet (DiResta et al., 2018a; McCombie et al., 2020; Zannettou et al., 2020).  Two 
of the most successful groups were on Facebook: United Muslims, and LGBT United 
(Albright, 2017a). 
Topics on the right-impersonating groups seemed designed to stir anger, and a 
feeling of outside threat, revolving around hatred and fear of Muslims, immigrants, 
refugees, queer people, and minorities (Howard et al., 2019; Linvill et al., 2019).  These 
posts also featured frequent appeals to patriotism and Christianity, and were often 
phrased with violent language and expressed hostility towards marginalised groups 
(Blair, 2017; DiResta et al., 2018a, 2018b; Lukito et al., 2020).   
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In right-impersonating groups, the IRA sought to mobilise voters for Trump.  In 
marginalised-impersonating groups they sought to suppress voters, keeping them from 
voting for Clinton (Howard et al., 2019; Kim, 2018; National Intelligence Council, 2017).  
In general, the IRA sought to elect Trump, but also to foment violence and discord, while 
creating distrust in traditional sources of information like the media, and encouraging 
disillusionment with the government and democracy itself (Lukito, 2020; National 
Intelligence Council, 2017; Ziegler, 2018).   
2.5. Gaps in the literature 
While previous research has added much to our knowledge of the IRA and its 
activities, there are areas which have not been fully explored, and angles which have not 
been fully addressed.  Existing research tends to assume that the community an IRA-
controlled account impersonated is also the intended audience for propaganda created 
by that account.  For instance, if an account impersonated queer people, it would be 
assumed that queer people were the intended target of that account’s posts (DiResta et 
al., 2018b; Howard et al., 2019; Linvill et al., 2019).  This conflation appears in the 
tendency of studies to split IRA-controlled social media accounts into fairly broad 
categories.  These categories are often based upon presumed political ideology of the 
impersonated community/assumed audience, sometimes with the addition of categories 
based upon race or religion, all of which may create a simplified view of the complexities 
of the identities involved (Guittar & Guittar, 2015; Massaquoi, 2015). 
Thus far, there does not appear to have been categorisation – or analysis – of 
IRA-controlled social media accounts based upon a clear factor that many of the 
communities impersonated by the IRA share: being marginalised.  Many studies have 
looked at accounts deemed right-leaning and accounts deemed left-leaning, however 
even in these projects the primary focus appears to have been on right-impersonating 
accounts.  This focus may be due to the more blatantly hostile language and 
encouragement to concrete political activity present in these right-impersonating 
accounts (DiResta et al., 2018b; Howard et al., 2019; Lukito, 2020).  While they are 
discussed in many studies, there has been overall less attention given to marginalised-
impersonating accounts; notably, there has been limited in-depth focus on United 
Muslims, which impersonated the Muslim community, despite the recognised centrality 
21 
of Islamophobia and Muslim identity in the IRA’s political interference campaign (Badawy 
et al., 2019; DiResta et al., 2018a; Howard et al., 2019). 
Though the literature examining the IRA’s social media activity has provided 
significant insights, there are a number of angles and tools which have yet to be widely 
employed.  Overall, previous studies do not appear to have featured much in-depth 
consideration of context (historical, societal, and in terms of power relations), application 
of critical theories, or use of researchers who have insider knowledge of the 
communities being impersonated.  While the research may, in fact, have included 
researchers from marginalised communities, in most cases whether they did so is 
unclear, as the majority of studies lack discussion of researchers’ positionality (Zempi, 
2016). 
By focusing on these under-emphasised aspects, bringing in critical 
perspectives, performing qualitative analysis to examine marginalised-impersonating 
social media accounts, taking advantage of insider knowledge, and incorporating 
extensive consideration of context, the current study aims to address some of the gaps 
in the existing literature.   
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Chapter 3.  
 
Methods 
This chapter describes the methodology (the wider philosophical approach to the 
research) and methods (the specific choice of techniques) employed in the current 
study.  It explores the choice of qualitative methods, in particular qualitative content 
analysis, and data collection process, including source and sampling.  As well, this 
chapter outlines the critical perspective that underlies the study as a whole, and the 
analysis of the data via an iterative coding process, which resulted in a number of in-
depth themes.  Finally, the chapter features a discussion of positionality and researcher 
identity.   
3.1. Qualitative content analysis of social media posts 
Qualitative research facilitates deep analysis and interpretation, and examination 
of subtleties and nuances that other forms of research may not attain (Barbour, 2019b; 
Saldana, 2011).  Qualitative research is flexible, allowing researchers to select methods 
that suit the needs of each individual study – the data, the context, the tools, and the 
researcher themselves (Barbour, 2019b; Flick, 2014; Schreier, 2014). 
This study is a qualitative content analysis of organic content – posts posted by 
the IRA-controlled Facebook groups (Albright, 2017c).  Content analysis is a “research 
method for the subjective interpretation for the content of text data through the 
systematic classification process of coding and identifying themes or patterns” (Hsieh & 
Shannon, 2005, p. 1278).  Content analysis is valuable for explaining IRA content, as it 
excels at digging deep, finding and analysing manifest meanings (those which are most 
apparent, surface-level), and latent meanings (those which are sub textual, less obvious, 
and connotative) (Saldana, 2011).  It is vital that this analysis consider the context 
around the data; the real-world events surrounding its creation and reception (Barbour, 
2019).  This method also provides a method for reducing data, which permits more 
effective analysis of large datasets (Schreier, 2014).   
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3.2. Data collection and sampling  
This sample originates from data collected and made available by Dr. Jonathan 
Albright, who is currently research director of Columbia University’s Tow Center for 
Digital Journalism (Albright, 2017a; Timberg, 2017).  Albright has researched 
disinformation and Russian foreign interference on social media for several years, and 
has been part of major reports and projects relating to the IRA (DiResta et al., 2018b; 
Lapowsky, 2018).  While Facebook acknowledged and released information regarding 
IRA-purchased ads, they did not share data from the actual IRA-controlled Facebook 
groups until much later, during the Senate Select Committee’s investigation (United 
States. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence, 2019b).   
Albright, recognising that looking only at ads would give a partial picture of IRA 
activity and impact, gathered organic posts (Lapowsky, 2018).  He used leaks reported 
in the media to identify Facebook groups which were believed to be controlled by the 
IRA, identifications subsequently confirmed by financial and paper trails, as seen in 
Senate reports and indictments (Lapowsky, 2018; Timberg, 2017; United States. 
Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence, 2019a; United States v. Internet 
Research Agency LLC, 2018).  Amongst these groups were ‘LGBT United’ and ‘United 
Muslims of America’.   
Moving to access and preserve data before Facebook removed these groups 
and associated data, Albright used Facebook’s own tool, CrowdTangle, to access and 
download text posts and associated metadata (Lapowsky, 2018; Timberg, 2017).  In this 
way, he obtained the 500 most recent posts in each Facebook group he pursued.  After 
cleaning, organising, and arranging the data, Albright uploaded it to data.world and 
Tableau, on Oct. 4, 2017 (Albright, 2017c, 2017a).  The 500 posts in the United Muslims 
dataset range in posting date from Jan. 26, 2016–August 23, 2017.  The 500 posts in 
LGBT Untied range from July 12, 2015–August 24, 2017. 
LGBT United and United Muslims were purposively selected because they 
represent two of the IRA’s attempts to impersonate marginalised groups.  These 500 
posts from LGBT United, and 500 from United Muslims – for a total of 1000 posts - 
provided enough scope for exploration while keeping the expansiveness of the research 
to a manageable level (Barbour, 2019b).  This purposive sample created a manageable 
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and useful target for analysis, with hope of reaching data saturation, as well as providing 
strong room for making comparisons between the two datasets (Barbour, 2019b; 
Rapley, 2014).  In a sense this was also a convenience sample, as Albright’s datasets 
are some of the only readily-repositories of organic posts from IRA-controlled Facebook 
accounts (Albright, 2020; Saldana, 2011). 
In these datasets, only the textual material could be seen, not the associated 
images which were included in the original posts.  Available information also included a 
modicum of posts’ metadata, e.g., the date posted.  The collected posts did not include 
the comments which would have been made in response to the post, nor does it include 
the type of reactions given to the post, such as likes, ‘hearts’, et cetera.  This information 
would have been a fascinating and valuable source for analysis. 
When possible, further information was gathered regarding the original contents 
of a post.  For instance, if a post referenced a news story or current event, a google 
search was performed to determine the veracity of statements, and the specific topic of 
the post.  This additional research helped judge if posts were accurately presenting 
information, as well as giving an indication of the angle of the posts. 
3.3. Coding and analysis 
Grounded theory guided the analysis, developing theory by allowing insights to 
emerge that are grounded in the data itself (Barbour, 2019a; Charmaz, 2015).  The 
process involved iterative analysis, constant comparison, and continual reworking and 
refining (Charmaz, 2015; Maher et al., 2018).  Grounded theory was especially 
appropriate to analyse these datasets, as part of what made this data so intriguing was 
its enigmatic and many-layered nature.   
This qualitative content analysis was also a highly iterative process, with frequent 
re-examination of data when new themes emerged, comparison of datasets, and coding 
and re-coding to develop solid themes (Barbour, 2019a; Elliott, 2018; Saldana, 2011).  
The coding process involved use of NVivo, Excel, and a ridiculous amount of paper.   
Initial coding largely focussed on categorisation and concepts, noting frequently 
appearing topics, words, and even formatting. These emergent codes were then 
organised into categories in a continual iterative process, going through levels of 
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development and refinement, repeatedly comparing data, codes, and categories, to each 
other and between datasets.  Eventually, these codes and categories were interpreted 
into themes (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005; Schreier, 2014).   
Gaining greater context for understanding and interpreting posts required 
frequent further research.  For instance, a number of United Muslims posts necessitated 
googling Arabic phrases and reading parts of the Qur’an.  Analysis also involved simple 
counting, especially with regard to repeated posts, which were a common occurrence.  
This counting consisted of doing a dataset-wide text search for every single post, to 
determine if the post, or even specific phrasing from it, was re-posted at a later date. 
Codes, and eventually themes, were highly applicable between the two datasets, 
supporting the striking initial impression of similarity they gave. There were visible 
similarities between the datasets; between their formats, methodology, post length, and 
tactics, as well as many areas of content.  These two groups look remarkably similar to 
one another, but quite different from other IRA Facebook groups, such as Secured 
Borders or Blacktivist (Albright, 2017c; DiResta et al., 2018a).     
3.4. Rigour 
Qualitative rigour does not look the same as quantitative rigour; qualitative 
research aims not for validity, but rather for concepts such as trustworthiness, credibility, 
dependability, and transferability (Barbour, 2014; Maher et al., 2018).  In this study, 
examples from the data will support arguments, with thick description, and references to 
other academic research, giving evidence to suggest that my findings are plausible 
interpretations of the data, supporting my claim to credibility and dependability (Korstjens 
& Moser, 2018; Maher et al., 2018; Saldana, 2011).  In-depth description of methods, 
actions, challenges, and decisions will hopefully create transparency, contributing to 
trustworthiness, as well as giving readers sufficient information that it will be possible to 
see how these conclusions can apply to other contexts, thus enhancing transferability 
(Barbour, 2014; Greene, 2014; Korstjens & Moser, 2018).  Transparency regarding 
positionality - with implementation of constant reflexivity in considering how my position, 
beliefs, biases, and assumptions may affect analysis – will hopefully serve to encourage 
belief that my analysis is trustworthy (Berger, 2015; Maher et al., 2018; Saldana, 2011).   
26 
3.5. Positionality and perspective 
Positionality relates to the ways in which a researcher’s identities and experience 
inevitably impact the performance and conclusions of research (Saldana, 2011).   These 
identities and experiences are not a negative, but rather something to be acknowledged 
and addressed, with the potential for attempting to ameliorate negative effects, 
especially through reflexivity (Berger, 2015; Gould, 2015).   
Zempi (2016) lists several aspects of identity that a researcher should address, 
especially as they relate to research and its context.  Guided by this, I enumerate my 
own position: I am a white, cisgender, disabled, bisexual queer woman.  I was raised as 
a conservative evangelical Christian, was born in Canada with English as my first 
language, and I have a post-secondary education (as demonstrated by the existence of 
this thesis).  My identities intersect, and affect the way I experience the world; some of 
my identities are marginalised, whereas in other identities I am part of a dominant group 
(Crenshaw, 1991; Hayfield & Huxley, 2015; Massaquoi, 2015; Rahman, 2010).   
Nonetheless, identity as a researcher might supersede any other identities, 
especially in the eyes of members of the marginalised community to which the 
researcher belongs, which may make it impossible for a researcher to ever truly be an 
insider (Hayfield & Huxley, 2015).  Bruckert (2014) discusses her fears that, despite her 
shared identity as part of the marginalised community she was doing research within, 
her identity as an academic – part of a group which has done great harm to this 
community - might lead her participants to recognise her “as the outsider I fear I am” (p. 
312).   
The placement of oneself as insider or outsider must acknowledge the inherent 
fluidity of such boundaries, which ceaselessly shift a researcher may share some 
identities, but not others, and which of those identities is most relevant changes from 
moment to moment and context to context (Bailey et al., 2019; Berger, 2015; Couture et 
al., 2012). In the present study, I am both an insider and an outsider, and inhabit that 
strange shifting world in-between, as my multiplicity of identities intersect (Dwyer & 
Buckle, 2009; Lozano-Neira & Marchbank, 2016).   
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 I am an insider as a member of the queer community, yet I am an outsider 
because I am not a member of the Muslim community (Hayfield & Huxley, 2015; Zempi, 
2016).  In addition, I am a white person who was raised as a conservative evangelical 
Christian.  While I am no longer part of that religious group, I still have insider knowledge 
relating to that community.  Thus, I take a position analogous to Barbour’s (2019) key 
informant: someone who is no longer within a community or situation, but is still ‘in the 
know’ and can provide insights into it based on that knowledge.   
The findings of this current study argue that consideration of the evangelical 
Christian community is useful to explore the IRA’s efforts to impersonate Muslims and 
the queer community.  Therefore, my experiential knowledge of being a white 
conservative evangelical Christian is relevant.  As will be discussed, this group is 
notable, and may be a ripe target for the IRA’s impersonation of Muslims and queer 
people, with the potential to be susceptible to believing false, damaging stereotypes and 
potentially acting upon these beliefs in harmful ways (Glass, 2019; Gorski, 2017; Lewis 
et al., 2017; Wolff et al., 2012). 
Placing myself as an insider or outsider is yet more complex because the people 
creating the content are Russians impersonating these marginalised communities 
(Howard et al., 2019; Kim et al., 2018)!  However, “fabrications can still “tell us 
something about the manner in which specific social and cultural ideas …are 
constructed” (Hookway, 2008, p. 97).   
Insiders and outsiders both bring unique benefits, challenges, and necessary 
practices for encouraging quality of research (Berger, 2015; Finefter-Rosenbluh, 2017; 
Hayfield & Huxley, 2015).  An insider is “better equipped with insights and the ability to 
understand implied content…and more sensitized to certain dimensions of the data “ 
(Berger, 2015, p. 223).   
My identity and insider positions are important, as they frequently play a part in 
my interpretation of data, as my own lived experience and knowledge create insight and 
nuance (Berger, 2015; Finefter-Rosenbluh, 2017; Hayfield & Huxley, 2015).  This is true 
both as a member of the queer community, and as a former conservative evangelical 
Christian.  Often my interpretation is supported by existing research; sometimes, 
however, research into a specific area, issue, or factor simply does not exist, which 
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might be seen as a rather common experience for members of marginalised groups 
(Carrotte et al., 2016; Tuhiwai Smith, 2012).  In these cases, my paradigm as an insider 
provides background and context for interpretation (Berger, 2015; Saldana, 2011; 
Zempi, 2016).   
As a member of the queer community, I am aware of – and fluent in – many 
queer “shibboleths”.  Shibboleths are “words or phrases in particular contexts that allow 
members of a niche group to recognize one another” (Fraser, 2015).  They are secret 
signs, recognisable as correct and familiar to those in-the-know, but difficult to recognise 
or imitate for outsiders, serving as signals of authenticity, credibility, trustworthiness, 
solidarity, and common experience.  Small, widely-known details are passwords, 
markers, that make someone appear to be ‘one of us’ (DeCook, 2018; Fraser, 2015).   
Failure to adequately pass the shibboleth test plays into a theme discussed later 
in this study – Bad Imitations.  This theme, and this failure, demonstrate the necessity for 
insider knowledge and researchers; things that appeared blatantly incongruous to me 
may not have to others (Berger, 2015; Zempi, 2016).  What worked to appear genuine 
for people who were not members of the queer community, may ring false for those 
more familiar with the community’s language and culture (Fraser, 2015; Zempi, 2016). 
My experience being raised as a white conservative evangelical Christian gives 
me another type of insight – insight into Islamophobia, transphobia, and homophobia 
(Johnston, 2016; Kanamori et al., 2017; Wolff et al., 2012).  I have experience with these 
prejudices, and the fears stoked and stereotypes believed.  However, I must be diligent 
to monitor my assumptions, recognising that every person’s experiences and 
understandings will be different, especially those who have different intersectional 
identities (Dwyer & Buckle, 2009; Hayfield & Huxley, 2015).  I must guard against the 
dangers of imposing my perceptions, by questioning interpretations while looking for 
alternative explanations and negative cases (Berger, 2015). 
In my personal and academic life, I have long respected, and been interested in 
learning about, the Muslim community.  I have researched, read, explored, and asked 
questions, seeking to know more, while also trying to support the Muslim community and 
combat Islamophobia.  Nonetheless, as an outsider to the Muslim community, I run the 
danger of bringing in and reinforcing harmful stereotypes, promulgating inaccurate 
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interpretations, speaking over community members, and reproducing dangerous 
prejudices (Berger, 2015; Hayfield & Huxley, 2015; Zempi, 2016).   
To increase my understanding, and to try to guard against doing such harm, I 
dedicated myself to ‘putting in the work’.  I have immersed myself in reading academic 
literature, especially critical qualitative research which featured participants speaking 
about their own experiences, as well as research completed by Muslim scholars.  I 
sought to explore the heterogeneity of the Muslim community, questioning and 
investigating assumptions and stereotypes, doing my best to delve widely to hear many 
voices and perspectives.  I aimed to look in-depth at context, both historical and current.  
I also approached non-academic sources, from blogs to websites to rants and memes, 
as well as discussing issues with Muslim friends. 
My analysis of United Muslims is also aided by the potential for comparison 
provided by LGBT United, which impersonates a community I am more familiar with 
(DiResta et al., 2018b; Howard et al., 2019). Patterns I recognised in LGBT United could 
subsequently be looked for in United Muslims.  However, it must be emphasised: 
research into propaganda which impersonates – or attempts to incite hatred against – 
the Muslim community would benefit hugely from insider research by Muslim scholars 
(Hayfield & Huxley, 2015; Zempi, 2016).   
All research was approached from a critical criminological perspective: intentional 
awareness of the importance of intersectionality, marginalisation, and power relations 
(Arrigo & Bersot, 2015; Belknap, 2015).   A critical perspective guides researchers to 
keep in mind goals and principles relating to the power of marginalised groups.  A critical 
lens seeks empowerment of oppressed people, with special attention to 
disempowerment and forces that do these groups harm (Arrigo & Bersot, 2015; Ball, 
2016; Belknap, 2015).  Intersectional thought focuses on the complexities of identity and 
ways in which identities result in unique experiences, and often specifically in unique 
experiences of victimisation and oppression (Bailey et al., 2019; Crenshaw, 1991; 
Rahman, 2010).   
This research also contains elements of feminist theory and queer theory, both of 
which are forms of critical theory themselves (Ball, 2016; Ball et al., 2014; Hordge-
Freeman, 2018).  These theories are guaranteed to inform my research because of my 
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own identity as a queer woman and feminist, as well as my methodological background 
as a critical researcher. 
Feminist theory is very important to this research, as many of the prejudices and 
fears discussed and relating to these communities centre around women, and how the 
excuse of protecting women is used as a justification for discrimination (Blumell et al., 
2019). Queer theory is essential, as both groups face the intricacies of prejudices which 
can relate to transphobia and homophobia, as well as gender (Freude & Vergés Bosch, 
2020; Massaquoi, 2015).  It is also essential to consider the ways in which identities 
intersect: Muslim women, queer women, queer Muslims, and queer Muslim women, all 
very much exist (Thompson, 2020).   
In addition, this study is informed by post-colonial theory, to guide examination of 
issues around Western imperialism and the ongoing effects of colonialism (Kerner, 2018; 
Santesso, 2017).  This is especially vital when considering the Muslim community, which 
has been, and still is, hugely impacted by colonialism and Western imperialism 
(Brayson, 2019; Rahman, 2014). 
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Chapter 4.  
 
Results 
This chapter presents the themes that emerged from analysis of organic posts 
from LGBT United and United Muslims.  These themes reveal suggestive patterns and 
meanings, backed by intense research, insider knowledge, and rich description including 
frequent use of quotes, to support interpretations.  The content is described in terms of 
its prima facie nature, the surface-level characteristics and notable features.  Then, 
discussion moves to the ways in which the IRA appropriated and impersonated these 
marginalised identities, seeking to avoid detection while attempting to appear legitimate, 
often making use of non-textual media, and frequently using the real communities’ own 
work and words.  Despite such efforts, these attempts had noticeable flaws.   
The third theme focuses on inaction, and attempts to generate political passivity, 
in distinct contrast to the usual political activism of marginalised communities on social 
media.  The next theme explores the encouragement of feelings of fear, anger, 
helplessness, and victimisation, and the manipulation of subsequent isolation and in-
group trust.  Next, there is description of content that was likely to strike at sensitive 
places, by specifically discussing – and often antagonising – Christianity, as well as 
repeatedly emphasising ‘dog-whistle’ issues.  Finally, the chapter closes with discussion 
of a notable feature of the issues raised in these groups: the issues are legitimate.   
4.1. Content 
As part of the analysis of these datasets, posts were sorted into basic categories 
based upon their most obvious – prima facie – nature or angle.  In this phase of coding, 
content was not examined in great depth for nuance; instead, most posts were 
categorised quite simply.  Nonetheless, notable findings appeared.  The three categories 
that arose for LGBT United were Pro-Queer, Anti-Religious, and Undetermined.  The 
three categories that appeared for United Muslims were Pro-Muslim, Anti-Religious (that 
is, negative towards religions other than Islam), and Undetermined. 
Unsurprisingly, given that these pages claimed to be operated by members of 
their eponymous communities, the majority of LGBT United’s posts (68.4%, n=342) were 
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Pro-Queer, and the majority of United Muslims’ posts (60.6%, n=303) were Pro-Muslim.  
Posts designated Pro-Queer featured content that spoke positively about queer people, 
or negatively about homophobia.  For instance, “I support LGBTQ+ rights because it 
doesn't matter who you are, what you look like or how you dress. Love is love and 
everyone should have equal rights to express that!”.  Posts designated Pro-Muslim 
likewise featured content which spoke positively about Muslims or Islam, or negatively 
about Islamophobia, as well as posts that broadly encouraged unity and denounced 
prejudice.  For instance, “Muslims make America great too!”, and “MUSLIM 
AMERICANS AND PROUD !”. 
If it was not possible to identify the nature of the original post, its angle was 
categorised as Undetermined.  27.6% (n=138) of posts in LGBT United, and 36.8% 
(n=184) of posts in United Muslims, had an Undetermined angle.  Often, these posts are 
very brief, offering little detail about their original nature or intent.  Most posts within 
these datasets were quite short.  Such brevity is unusual when compared with IRA-
created Facebook pages that imitated right-wing users (such as Patriot Us or Secured 
Borders), and more prominent non-right-wing IRA-created Facebook pages (such as 
Blacktivist), which, overall, featured much longer posts (Albright, 2017c).  This may also 
reflect the frequency of content not being apparent in both LGBT United and United 
Muslims, due to use of non-textual media, as is discussed in subsequent sections.  An 
example from LGBT United reads, “My feelings are like...”; an example from United 
Muslims reads, “Some people have to understand this...” 
Despite its small size, making up only 4% (n=20) of LGBT United, and 2.6 % 
(n=13) of United Muslims, the final category – Anti-Religious - is worthy of note.  To be 
labelled Anti-Religious in angle, a post had to feature comments that were negative 
towards any religion (aside from Islam), or practitioners of any religion (aside from 
Islam). Most of these Anti-Religious posts specifically focused on Christianity and 
Christians, though some also mentioned the concept of religion as a whole, and 
occasionally posts had negative sentiment directed towards other religions such as 
Judaism.   
An Anti-Religious post in LGBT United stated, “.. Jeeeez I sure do wish we could 
reinstate biblical law! It was just so rational and moral...*sarcasm*”.  Within United 
Muslims, an Anti-Religious post read, “Many Non-Muslims and mainly Christians 
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sometimes Mock how Muslims pray ... here is the surprise !!!”.   Anti-Religious posts 
often relate to experiences of discrimination from the religious people towards members 
of the community the Facebook page impersonated. 
Table 1  Angles of LGBT United and United Muslims 





Pro-Queer 342 (68.4%) Pro-Muslim 303 (60.6%) 
Undetermined 138 (27.6%) Undetermined 184 (36.8%) 
Anti-Religious 20 (4.0%) Anti-Religious 13 (2.6%) 
Total 500 Total 500 
The concept of fake news is widespread when examining the work of the IRA 
(DiResta et al., 2018b; Raine et al., 2017; Tucker et al., 2018).  With this in mind, the 
datasets’ posts were examined for accuracy, and grouped into multiple categories based 
upon the reality or confirmability of the statement made.  The categories that appeared 
in LGBT United and United Muslims were Content Not Apparent, Unsupported Opinion, 
Partially True, Undetermined, Just the Truth, and Fake (See Table 2).    
Table 2 Content Breakdown of LGBT United and United Muslims 















284 (56.8%) 195 (39%) 479 (47.9%) 
Unsupported 
Opinion 
176 (35.2%) 247 (49.4%) 423 (42.3%) 
Partially True 28 (5.6%) 23 (4.6%) 51 (5.1%) 
Undetermined 12 (2.4%) 11 (2.2%) 23 (2.3%) 
Just the Truth 0 (0%) 22 (4.4%) 22 (2.2%) 
Fake 0 (0%) 2 (0.4%) 2 (0.2%) 
Total n=500 n=500 n=1000 
 
Those labeled Content Not Apparent simply could not be fully categorised as to 
accuracy, because part of the original post was not there to examine, and the remaining 
text did not make such a determination possible.  The highest percentage of the 500 
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posts in LGBT United, 56.8% (n=284), and second-highest percentage of the 500 posts 
in United Muslims, 39% (n=195), were categorised as Content Not Apparent, which is a 
notable finding, as will be discussed further. 
Posts categorised as Unsupported Opinion contained statements that were 
neither truly provable or disprovable: they could not count as literally fake news, because 
they did not claim to be any news – or fact – at all.  Instead, these posts stated opinions, 
feelings, and (supposed) beliefs.  They cannot be fact-checked, because they do not 
purport to contain facts.  The largest percentage of posts in United Muslims, 49.4% 
(n=247), and second-largest percentage of posts in LGBT United, 35.2% (n=176), 
consisted of Unsupported Opinion.   
In United Muslims, these Unsupported Opinion posts often made simple claims 
about Islam, such as in a post reading, “There is no racism in Islam”.  These statements 
and slogans often featured exhortations to like and share, such as, “Islam is the religion 
of peace for all mankind! Like and share if you agree!”.  Unsupported Opinion posts 
within LGBT United looked somewhat similar, with fairly brief, emotional, or simplistic 
statements, which were likely easy for people to agree with: “Sanctity of marriage, my 
a$$. My gay a$$, to be precise. After all unbelievable sh*t people do, gay marriage 
should not be questioned by anyone.”, read one post, while another said, “All parents 
should be aware that when they mock or curse gay people, they may be mocking or 
cursing their own child...”.   
Partially True applies to posts that featured a verifiably accurate piece of 
information, accompanied by opinion-based commentary which went beyond provable 
truth.  Accuracy was determined by a Google search relating to the statement or event 
described, searching for evidence of its occurrence and truth, and comparing the 
confirmed facts to the portrayal within the post. Often, these posts involved real news 
stories, taken from reputable news sources.  Partially True posts made up 5.6% (n=28) 
of LGBT United, and 4.6% (n=23) of United Muslims.   
A Partially True post from United Muslims stated, 
This man is a former cop named Jim Stachowiak goes radical against 
#BlackLivesMatter #BLM and the Muslim Communities and openly calls for 
people to burn down the homes of African Americans and Muslims and to 
shoot people, including women and children. publicly saying that the killing 
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of the Muslim Imam in #NewYork is just the beginning !! How has he not 
been charged? These are clear and obvious threats. WE DEMAND THE 
AUTHORITIES TO PUT HIM IN JAIL ! SHARE ! 
This post features definite elements of verifiable truth.  Stachowiak is indeed a former 
police officer who has threatened and encouraged violence against Black Lives Matter 
activists, as reported in the Washington Post (Holley, 2016).  He has also repeatedly 
threatened and encouraged violence against the Muslim community, as seen in his own 
frightening, hate-filled YouTube videos, one of which features him standing outside a 
mosque with a gun, calling for “death to Islam”, and another of which features him 
encouraging people to burn down mosques and murder all Muslims (Mathias, 2016).  
This post is, therefore, based on actual events and full of true statements.  The addition 
of opinion-based commentary and demands takes it into the category of Partially True.   
Undetermined was a category for ‘oddball’ posts, often those which did not 
actually make a statement, but instead asked a question, shared a quote, or made a 
request for action.  These posts may have related to a desire for engagement, possibly a 
ploy to drive up numbers (DiResta et al., 2018b; Lukito, 2020).  The LGBT United post: 
“Hey, guys, tell me a little about yourself!”, and United Muslims’ “Share if you are a 
Muslim and you are proud !!” both qualify as Undetermined.  Overall, this category 
comprised just 2.4% (n=12) of LGBT United, and 2.2% (n=11) of United Muslims. 
The remaining categories represent the two possible extremes of fact, and 
interestingly are both only found in United Muslims.  Posts labelled Just the Truth 
featured statements that were demonstrably, provably accurate, with no opinion 
appended; they made up 4.4 % (n=22) of United Muslims.  They usually consisted of 
news stories, often directly quoting one or more paragraphs from a published article.  
Most of these stories related to Muslim individuals, usually with a positive bent.  For 
instance, one United Muslims post states “More than 30,000 Muslims from around the 
world congregated at a farm in the United Kingdom for a three-day event protesting ISIS 
and religious extremism.”  This post is an exact quote of the first paragraph from a Mic 
news story (Harvard, 2016).    
The smallest percentage, a mere 0.4% (n=2) of United Muslims, were fully Fake.  
This actually was a single statement, posted twice (repeat posts being a frequent feature 
within both datasets), which claimed that a UNESCO study had determined that Islam 
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was the world’s most peaceful nation.  The content of the post originated from a satirical 
site, as part of a long satirical article; the truncated satirical article was subsequently 
passed around the internet as supposed truth, to the point that UNESCO actually issued 
a statement refuting it (AFP Fact Check, 2019).  In the entirety of the data analyzed, this 
post was the only completely fake news.  
An important caveat immediately arises, however, in considering the posts 
deemed Content Not Apparent.  These datasets only consisted of text (issues arising 
from this are discussed in greater depth within the Limitations section).  Some of the 
same potential limitations based in analyzing these text-only data sets are likely to be 
repeated in circumstances of use of artificial intelligence programs which only read text.  
Therefore, just as for this study, a large amount of content may go unseen, and potential 
disinformation remain unexamined, when governments or other agencies attempt to 
discover interference from hostile forces (Marcellino et al., 2020).   
4.1.1.  “Tells”: Format and patterns 
Both United Muslims and LGBT United partially or exactly repeated several 
posts, often appearing to simply copy-and-paste previously posted statements, right 
down to the number of exclamation marks. The most frequently repeated posts were 
usually either highly controversial/provocative, or had the potential to be very popular 
and therefore frequently liked and shared (DiResta et al., 2018b; Timberg, 2017).   
In United Muslims, the most frequently-repeated posts – with 10 repeats in this 
500 post sample – were variations on “Muslims are not terrorists, and terrorists are not 
Muslims. share if you agree.”; a simple, catchy, and likely quite shareable sentiment.  
The second most frequently-repeated posts – with 8 repeats – were versions of “Alcohol 
and pork is against Christian beliefs too but some people just tend to ignore the things 
they don't agree with.”  This statement may have been repeated due to its somewhat 
confrontational nature, which might succeed in angering conservative evangelical 
Christians (Gorski, 2017; Whitehead et al., 2018).   
Posts frequently featured anachronistic misspellings, which were often repeated.  
For instance, United Muslims repeatedly used the misspelled phrase “spread the world!” 
(as opposed to ‘spread the word’).  Other noticeable features included use of 
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capitalization, including unusual capitalization of the first letters of multiple words in a 
sentence. Posts also frequently featured a number of hashtags, often not entirely related 
to the post in question, which may have been an effort to boost the chance of their 
particular post being seen, if someone was browsing tags (DiResta et al., 2018b; Miller, 
2019).   
Increasing the number and variety of tags, especially tagging for widely- popular 
topics of discussion, could be a method to increase visibility. It may also come up in 
cases where the hashtag used was potentially a place in which individuals from different 
ends of the political spectrum might both come, and, perhaps clash, creating a useful 
situation for discord (DiResta et al., 2018b).  For instance, a post from LGBT United 
reads: 
“You know, God once said "Thou shalt not reproduce if the couple has the 
combined IQ of potato." Because God is really annoyed by some people's 
stupidity, just as we are! :-) #homophobia #reproduce #religion #lgbt 
#humor #family”.   
Using #religion means religious users who search that hashtag may come across this 
post. 
4.2. (Attempted) identity theft 
As with their other social media pages, the IRA needed LGBT United and United 
Muslims to be seen as legitimate representatives of the communities they purported to 
be a part of, to gain influence and audience, while avoiding detection (DiResta et al., 
2018b; Howard et al., 2019).  Their attempts involved taking content directly from the 
queer and Muslim communities, especially in terms of memes, photos, videos, and other 
non-textual media.  The impersonations, however, showed noticeable flaws - or at least, 
flaws which might be noticeable to genuine members of the community being 
impersonated (Fraser, 2015). 
4.2.1. Playing a part 
The pages deliberately claimed an identity, doing so with repeated statements 
directly declaring membership, as well as more subtle references and implications.  
Posts also claimed experience, appealing to the existence (and fight against) prejudice.     
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Many posts in the datasets might be intended as “bait”: posts that evoke positive 
emotion, are humorous, or feature popular, highly shareable slogans, with widely 
agreed-upon sentiments (or clichés) (Kim, 2018).  Sharing non-textual media such as 
memes or screenshots of Tumblr or Twitter posts is a popular feature of many social 
media groups, and the dissemination and use of seemingly apolitical vaguely anti-
prejudice/pro-acceptance posts could draw an audience (Gal et al., 2016; Spencer, 
2019; Zannettou et al., 2020). If these “bait” posts were highly liked or often shared, or 
attracted new page followers, this could increase the perceived credibility of the group, 
while enlarging the audience for future broadcasting of messages (DiResta et al., 2018b; 
Linvill et al., 2019).   
In fact, many of these simplistic, slogan-based posts specifically exhorted 
readers to share them, while others requested ‘likes’ to show support for individuals 
whose stories they described.  United Muslims, for instance, repeatedly exclaimed, “Like 
and Share if you believe we all should be united !”.  A post in LGBT United read, “A boy 
can wear a f*cking dress if he wants! Hell yeah! F*ck stupid gender rules! Like if you 
agree :-)” 
Posts in both groups often featured very broad statements against issues like 
Islamophobia, homophobia, transphobia, along with vague but easily digestible 
declarations about equality and unity, and defense of the community from prejudice.  
The most frequently repeated posts within the United Muslims dataset focused on quite 
shareable slogans: “Muslims aren’t terrorists and terrorists aren’t Muslims.”  Another 
post in United Muslims exclaims, “IN ISLAM, THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE BETWEEN 
BLACK AND WHITE, RICH OR POOR... WE ARE ALL THE SAME, KNEELING TO 
GOD ONLY!”.   
Posts in both datasets appeared to purposefully target and exaggerate 
emotionality. This included sharing positive statements, experiences, or representations 
of the respective marginalised groups.  These positive posts regularly featured appeals 
to pride, unity, and equality - simple and widely applicable concepts, as well as 
statements relating to celebration of the values of the community.  Other posts, in both 
groups, merely read as positive, cheerful, and even silly, celebrating identity, with 
multiple smiley faces, and invocation of group clichés.  LGBT United stated, “We are 
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superheroes. We have a lot of superpowers - love, unity, LGBT pride, equality, 
acceptance...and many more :-)”. 
This preponderance of mostly innocuous, unremarkable sentiments could 
potentially serve as a deterrent to researchers, who may view them as merely apolitical, 
or filler (Kim, 2018; Miller, 2019; Xia et al., 2019).  However, these posts, like all posts on 
these groups, likely served a purpose as the IRA worked to achieve its goals.  The posts 
could have acted as bait while the IRA was attempting to gain an audience, through 
making statements that many individuals, both within and outside of the communities are 
likely to agree with (Howard et al., 2019; Tucker et al., 2018).  The posts may have 
served to lull followers - and potential investigators - into a false sense of security.   
Other attempts to impersonate and appear to be queer or Muslim individuals 
included use of community-related terms and language.  Much of this use was fairly 
surface-level.  Several posts in United Muslims included Arabic religious terms, e.g. 
“Subhan Allah”, and some posts in United Muslims discussed elements of Islamic faith, 
such as the Qur’an, though these were few and far between.  Instead, the focus was on 
simplistic statements, one or two Arabic words, and sharing slogans and stories.   
Within LGBT United, some use of queer terminology was slightly more 
sophisticated, with references to concepts like gender roles, heteronormativity, and 
transphobia (Ball, 2016; Harbaugh & Lindsey, 2015).  Nonetheless, again, this failed to 
go very deep, and may have been picked up from the content they had taken from 
another source (most likely actual queer individuals).  One post read, “It will be a cold 
day in hell when people finally learn to use gender pronouns for transgender, 
genderqueer, and other gender-variant individuals correctly.”  This is a fairly impressive 
use of community-specific terminology.   
As far as could be ascertained, based upon the remaining textual commentary, 
as well as comparison of comments to images found in archived posts taken from LGBT 
United’s ‘sister account’ on Instagram, Rainbow Nation, non-textual media often 
appeared to consist of screenshots or images from conversations or posts created by 
actual members of the LGBTQ community (Albright, 2017b). This extends to the 
frequent use of images and videos of real queer and Muslim people, as well as their 
personal stories, and even their struggles, and in some cases, deaths.   
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This simple technique of using content created by the actual community that is 
being impersonated may serve multiple purposes.  It decreases workload while 
increasing perceived credibility: it would likely be easier to simply share content made by 
actual individuals from a community than it would be to successfully imitate these 
individuals (Bastos & Farkas, 2019; DiResta et al., 2018b).  Additionally, many memes 
and conversations tend to be humorous in nature, which could appeal to an audience 
and potentially gain followers (Heiskanen, 2017; Know Your Meme, 2016; Zannettou et 
al., 2020). 
4.2.2. Use of non-textual media 
LGBT United (See Figure 1) and United Muslims (See Figure 2) both show heavy 
reliance on use of non-textual media.  The frequent use of non-textual media appears to 
be an integral tactic in the IRA’s attempts to maintain a veneer of legitimacy, and evade 
detection. 
In this study, non-textual media includes images, text-on-image memes (known 
as image macros), screenshots of text-based discussions (usually conversations from 
sites such as Tumblr), as well as video clips and gifs.  Within the datasets analyzed, this 
non-textual media was not visible, leaving only the associated text available for analysis.  
The text on these posts usually featured a brief comment referring to, or commenting on, 
the image or video which was being shared.  For some posts, the general substance of 
the original post can still be deduced, whereas others are more difficult to parse.  An 
example from LGBT United states, “This Lesbian Couple Made The Best Pregnancy 
Announcement Ever”; from this, it can rather easily be determined that the original post 
featured a link to a lesbian couple’s pregnancy announcement.  Another LGBT United 
post reading ““what...*facepalm*” is a bit less obvious.   
This incomprehensibility of remaining comments, indicating further context was 
originally present, is one tell-tale sign of the presence of non-textual media.  Non-textual 
media was also evidenced by reference to the format of the associated non-textual 
media, as in a post from United Muslims reading, “What Halal meat or Halal food 
means? you shouldn't be scared after watching this video ;)”.  Posts classified as 
Content Not Apparent (see Table 1) usually appear to have featured non-textual media.  
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With research, however, it is sometimes possible to find the original non-textual media 
which was initially associated with that image (See Figure 3). 
The use of non-textual Media could be beneficial to the IRA, for a number of 
reasons.  The IRA may be aware of the likelihood that the governments or agencies they 
are working against may look toward solutions related to text-reading programs and 
artificial intelligence (Badawy et al., 2018; Hacker et al., 2018).  Use of images, 
therefore, creates a potential method to avoid detection, while also allowing their posts 
to look more legitimate.  The IRA claimed ownership of genuine, community-created 
material, suggesting they are ‘in the know’ – though sometimes their captions challenged 
that presentation, with notably bad imitations - giving them cultural capital and legitimacy 
(DeCook, 2018; Fraser, 2015; Zannettou et al., 2020). 
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Figure 2.       Non-textual media in United Muslims 
As DiResta et al (2018) discussed, the IRA’s social media uses “image centric 
(meme) warfare” (p. 8).  This often took the form of repurposed memes, taken from real 
communities, or as community-created text placed on a new background, and adorned 
with their own logo.  This form is an “image macro” – a simple image with text upon it 
(Huntington, 2016).  This likely boosted page popularity because it made use of genuine, 
in-community thoughts and humour.   
Figure 3 shows a meme shared by a LGBT United’s sister account on Instagram, 
Rainbow Nation, taken from data gathered and provided by Dr. Jonathan Albright 
(Albright, 2017b).  This image features plain text on a rainbow-gradient background (an 
obsession with rainbows seems to be an attempt to appear queer), as well as LGBT 
United’s logo, claiming ownership of this meme.  However, this meme, known as the 
“What’s in your pants?” meme, is quite recognisable within the queer community, and in 
fact its provenance can be traced with some reliability.  A plain text version of the exact 
same words was posted by a Tumblr user in 2015; the LGBT United/Rainbow Nation 
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Figure 3.        IRA-created meme using text that originated on queer Tumblr 
Memes are not just effective because they may to boost audience and 
legitimacy.  They also serve as incredibly powerful methods to transmit propaganda 
(DeCook, 2018; DiResta et al., 2018b; Heiskanen, 2017; Huntington, 2016).  The US 
government has studied memes as “powerful tools of cultural influence, capable of 
reinforcing or even changing values and behaviour” (DiResta et al., 2018, p. 50).  
Memes separate big statements from their context, and imply that a view is widely held 
by real members of a community, carrying cultural signifiers and language making an in-
group feeling (DeCook, 2018; Heiskanen, 2017; Huntington, 2016).  A statement can be 
accompanied by an image that appears to “support” the claim, such as women in burqas 
beneath a textual statement regarding banning veils (DiResta et al., 2018b). 
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4.2.3. Bad imitations 
 A main part of IRA efforts in running groups which purported to be marginalised 
online communities involved attempts to imitate these communities (Lukito et al., 2020; 
National Intelligence Council, 2017).  Some studies which have examined marginalised-
impersonating Facebook groups say that the posts show insight and subtlety, “tailored to 
fit seamlessly into the ordinary online conversations of their particular audiences” 
(Timberg, 2017).  However, consideration of these organic posts, with the benefit of 
insider knowledge and general familiarity, suggests a potentially different story: these 
imitations were not always successful (Berger, 2015).  Despite the efforts by the IRA, 
many of the actual text-based posts from LGBT United and United Muslims are distinctly 
‘off’, failing to adequately recreate shibboleths (Fraser, 2015).  These bad imitations use 
tropes of these cultures somewhat ineptly, creating posts that may not ring true to 
members of the actual communities.   
Within LGBT United, posts often featured statements that would be considered 
inappropriate within queer realms, or that simply read as gibberish. In fact, 64 of LGBT 
United’s posts were categorized as bad imitations: that is, messages that may not sound 
believably queer to a member of the queer community. For instance, one LGBT United 
post stated, “The power of the gay… It's not called being gay... It's called being 
FABULOUS!”. I wield my insider knowledge to say that repeated (non-ironic) use of the 
word ‘fabulous’ raises an immediate eyebrow.  
Another such bad imitation of a queer person reads: “This woman is 
STUNNING!! Like jaw-drooping-drool-pooling, stunning!! But it's hilarious when I hear 
women say "she turned me Gay!" No, you been Gay, and it's okay, congrats you're 
finally out!”.  This particular post was repeated four different times in the 500-item LGBT 
United dataset, despite its distinctly strange tone, which seems far-removed from the 
way a queer woman would typically speak about a woman they found attractive.   
Once again calling upon my experience within the online queer community, I can 
report that real queer women’s online declarations of attraction to another woman have a 
linguistic canon all their own, featuring flowery literary hyperbole, or facetious claims of 
violent actions, or simple declaration of the bald statement “I am so gay”, or, in some 
cases, extremely specific emojis of eyes.  The statement about ‘turning gay’ versus 
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‘being gay’ would also likely be poorly received, as the specific origin of queerness is 
considered to be a debate that goes nowhere and may be used to cause the community 
harm, so it is often viewed as inappropriate to bring up (Blumell et al., 2019; Minter, 
2017).   
Other posts skated close to being offensive, making proclamations about 
people’s sexual orientation, and conjuring up homophobic images of queer people 
supposedly pushing their sexuality onto others (GLAAD, 2016).  One post read, “"It's 
juuuust playing, I'm totz straight"... Stop kidding yourself, we all know you wanna try a 
girl.” Some posts seemed simply bizarre: “The teacher probably voted for Cruz ... 
Weeeeell it's our choice to call the teacher Mrs Twatwaffle the Thundercunt!”  
Another strange post referenced racial and homophobic slurs in a questionable 
and potentially insensitive manner, saying:  
Lord.... Oh my, yes he did. And what the Lord told him was "Tommy, boy, 
how are you gonna raise all that money without a good scapegoat? We 
tried the K*kes and ni**ers, and they don't work no more, so we still have 
to keep going after the fa**ots and d*kes, because that's the only ones left 
to demonize so we can scare the sh*t out those mindless members to keep 
tithing the hell out of their paychecks..." Oh wait, that wasn't the Lord, that 
was.... his accountant!!! 
Several posts also featured terms that were either out-of-date within their communities, 
or that would likely be viewed as offensive and unacceptable. For instance, one post 
used the word “transgendered”, as opposed to the proper “transgender,” reading in part: 
“When child coming out to their parents as gay, lesbian, or transgendered, many parents 
experience shock” (GLAAD, 2016; Steinmetz, 2014).  Another post used the word 
“transsexual”, which is also usually viewed as an inappropriate term (GLAAD, 2016).   
In United Muslims, attempts to appear genuine appear somewhat surface-level, 
featuring frequent use of Arabic religious terms, such as “MashaAllah”, and references to 
famous Muslim figures.  These Muslim figures, however, were usually those who could 
potentially be easily thought of by non-Muslim individuals.  Thus, there are repeated 
posts about Muhammad Ali and Mike Tyson, with very few referencing other modern 
Muslim celebrities, or significant Muslim historical figures.  This held true for LGBT 
United, as well: they had multiple posts about Jim Parsons, who, though he is a member 
of the queer community, is not really a figure of general renown.  Actual queer icons 
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were mostly missing, supplanted by strange alternatives like Woody Allen and 
Macklemore.   
In addition, United Muslims emphasised specific subjects, such as modesty and 
the hijab, while dedicating little space to important current political issues such as the 
Muslim Ban (Yukich, 2018).  Posts repeatedly focused on the hijab, with little discussion 
of specific religious thoughts behind it, and limited discussion of women’s agency or 
choices in relation to it, subjects that would be an expected focus in true discussions of 
veiling (Allen, 2015; Chakraborti & Zempi, 2012; Zempi, 2019).   
In United Muslims, one of the most telling mistakes was very major indeed: in 
four separate posts, the text names the Prophet Muhammad but does not follow the 
name with a notation such as ‘PBUH’, ‘peace be upon him’, ‘SAWS’, or any other 
version thereof.  Use of these notations is often considered so essential that it’s can 
even be used on social media as a sign that one is Muslim (Selby & Funk, 2020). One 
such post read, “Everyone who believe In One God and Muhammed God's prophet, 
Let's get united and let Allah be the only judge on us all.”   
4.3. A call to inaction: The curious incident of the dog in 
the night 
Within these Facebook groups, it is important to recognise what isn't posted, 
rather than simply looking at what is.  Seemingly missing from these groups are 
encouragements to political involvement, suggestions about voting, breakdown of party 
platforms, mention of coordinated political efforts, discussion of current legislation, or 
strategies to combat issues like Islamophobia or homophobia and transphobia.  This 
lack of political concern and action does not appear to reflect the typical use of social 
media by marginalised communities (Islam, 2019; Jenzen, 2017; Vivienne & Burgess, 
2012; Wills & Fecteau, 2016).   
Considering what is posted, it appears that political passivity is encouraged, and 
direct political involvement discouraged, by means of primarily posting items that have 
strong emotional value, but little active use. These include broad statements against 
issues like Islamophobia, homophobia, and transphobia along with angry or emotional 
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statements that do not include recommendations for an action to take, and vague but 
easily digestible declarations about equality, unity, pride, and love.   
LGBT United was noticeably unusual at first glance: it contained very little 
activism, discussion of political issues, or queer-related news stories. Among the 500 
posts, there were no calls to concrete action (e.g. requests to phone or write to 
politicians, sign a petition, or vote). Politicians were mentioned by name only eight times, 
usually in quotations from news stories, and these same news stories were typically the 
only places where specific laws were discussed.   
With regard to those specific laws, commentary on LGBT United primarily 
expressed anger, with no suggestions regarding concrete steps for community members 
to take. There were only a few references to the government, and those tended to be 
antagonistic and broad, articulating anger without recommending remedial actions, 
possibly encouraging disillusionment and distrust (Howard et al., 2019; United States v. 
Internet Research Agency LLC, 2018). One such post read, in part: “Fucking imbeciles! 
The majority of the rest of the developed nations are moving forward while we are 
running back to the mid 1900's! American Freedom and Democracy is Dead!”  
Only one post seemed to suggest a way for people to vote:  
That's why Republicans are just hell-bent on division because they want to 
hurt and divide Americans, and they are so rogue and potentially corrupt 
and they can't do their job correctly cause they only care about themselves 
and what they want and what their supporters want, not what ALL 
Americans want and they don't care about ALL Americans. I would just call 
for a boycott on the entire Republican Party, they need to go and be 
stopped from hurting our kids and Americans, and this nation needs to be 
a Democratic nation and the haters to go and crawl back where they came 
from, the basement.  
United Muslims largely held to the same pattern, with the exception of posts that 
specifically made a political demand: “Stop bombing Syria!”.  While 84 of the 500 posts 
could be seen as vaguely political in nature (e.g. “#Islamophobia is Anti #American, Like 
and share if you agree!”), only 12 seem to encourage a specific political action.  Of those 
12, 10 referred specifically to Syria, for instance: “Love him or hate him, the question is 
Where is Lybia now after bombing it and killing Kaddafi ??? Don't repeat this in Syria!”  
This is recognised as being in support of Russia’s actions and war in Syria, and a 
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potential attempt to build support for an end to American military action (DiResta et al., 
2018b; Lukito, 2020; National Intelligence Council, 2017). 
The Muslim Ban itself, while a major political event, is only referred to six times, 
and none of those posts encourage direct political actions (such as calling a senator, 
signing a petition, or attending a protest) (Blair, 2017; Yukich, 2018).  Instead, as with 
most of the posts that have any sort of potential political theme, they express anger, 
fear, or a general negative emotion, without encouraging any actions to take.  A post 
loudly states, “MR #TRUMP, SORRY YOU CANNOT BAN #MUSLIMS”; another 
exclaims, “If you agree to ban Muslims, then you agree to ban police officers, doctors, 
soldeirs, doctors, nurses, and many other Muslims working hard everyday for your safety 
and comfort in this country !!!” 
There is also a lack of intersectionality and solidarity: LGBT United said nothing 
about the Muslim Ban, and United Muslims had nothing to say about the Pulse shooting 
(in which 49 people were killed at an Orlando gay nightclub) (Meyer, 2020).  
Marginalised communities, though with plenty of racism, homophobia, transphobia, and 
other prejudices inside them, nonetheless might be expected to support one another and 
show solidarity in their shared struggle to survive in an often-hostile society (Kuruvilla, 
2017; Sirriyeh, 2019).  As well, people may belong to more than one marginalised 
community (for instance queer Muslims) (El-Tayeb, 2012; Shah, 2016).   
Overall, both datasets were striking in their general lack of distinctly political 
content, and exhibited a notable lack of political activism, calls to action, or information 
about issues affecting these communities. The absence of this content is unusual for 
such spaces, where politicised, marginalised identities mean that community will also 
almost inevitably include activism (Huntington, 2016; Islam, 2019; Jenzen, 2017).   
Various studies and reports discussed the IRA’s tactics of voter suppression in 
communities that were not right-wing; these tactics ranged from simply not focusing on 
political issues, to encouraging community members to vote for a third party, to direct 
lies about how to actually cast a ballot (DiResta et al., 2018b; Kim et al., 2018; Lukito et 
al., 2020).  These datasets’ lack of political content appears to be an extension of the 
IRA’s voter suppression efforts in marginalised-impersonating groups: enflaming fear 
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and anger, but trying to make sure that energy does not drive people to take concrete 
electoral action.   
4.4.  “Us” against the world 
In much of the world, queer and Muslim individuals face continual danger and 
hostility from the wider public (Alimahomed-Wilson, 2017; Bender-Baird, 2016; Patel, 
2017; Pew Research Center, 2017).  Online communities, however, are safe spaces, 
serving as sanctuaries where people can discuss and decry discrimination and share 
their outrage and fear, while receiving support from fellow community members 
(Cavalcante, 2019; Islam, 2019; Lucero, 2017; Pennington, 2018; Wills & Fecteau, 
2016).  They become places of trust, of belonging, of sheltering together as a bulwark 
against an aggressive world.    
These feelings are ripe for exploitation.   
4.4.1. Evoking anger and fear 
The datasets both tended towards broad, imprecise topics, and vaguely positive 
statements, frequently employing terms such as pride, equality, love, and acceptance. 
However, some of the more specific issues repeatedly posted were noteworthy, due to 
their intensely emotional and sometimes controversial nature.  Returning to the concept 
of Partially True posts, which featured elements of current events and news articles, 
most posts categorised thusly related to incidents of homophobia, transphobia, or 
Islamophobia, and even violence.  Dissemination of such stories may be an attempt to 
stoke fear within the targeted communities, an effect magnified by the emotional, 
distress-inducing commentary usually appended.   
Many posts within LGBT United and United Muslims seem designed to invoke 
feelings of anger and fear in followers.  Some are simple – highly emotionally-phrased – 
statements which serve to remind the community of the oppression they regularly face.  
A post in United Muslims exclaims, “STOP HARASSING AMERICAN MUSLIMS !” and 
numerous other posts include mention (or simply hashtags) of Islamophobia, along with 
reference to specific examples.  One of the most frequent sentiments is that “Muslims 
are not terrorists and terrorists are not Muslims!”, a theoretically positive statement which 
50 
still serves as a reminder of the prejudice and oppression Muslims experience in 
America (Karaman & Christian, 2020; Patel, 2017; Wolff et al., 2012).  This phrase, and 
variations upon it, is continuously repeated. 
Other United Muslims posts comment on the disparity of who is labelled a 
terrorist (Elmasry & El-Nawawy, 2020; Sharma & Nijjar, 2018).  One post refers to a real-
world murder, stating, “The guy in the picture is an atheist, he shot and murdered three 
Muslim young students few years ago. yet no one called him a terrorist.”  Another asks, 
rhetorically, “Is it a war on Islam and #Muslims ? and by the way our silence is the 
problem itself !!” 
Homophobia is frequently both chastised and angrily emphasised in LGBT 
United.  One post read, in part, “I am fucking angry because I'm really afraid to leave my 
home! I'm afraid that if I walk out my home, I'm going to be killed for being gay!”.  
Unfortunately, especially around the time this was posted, around the aftermath of the 
Orlando Pulse mass shooting, this might feel like a very relatable sentiment to many 
queer individuals, and serve as a reminder that they should be constantly wary of their 
safety (Gal et al., 2016; C. Jones & Slater, 2020; Meyer, 2020). 
A LGBT United post written in the first person described feelings of anger and 
despair many queer people might identify with: 
"Being gay's a choice" I chose to be gay because I enjoy being considered 
a second class citizen. I chose to be gay because I enjoy lying to my 
parents about where I am going and whom I am hanging out with. I chose 
to be gay because I like to keep pretending that boobs are hot in front of 
my friends. I chose to be gay because I like not being able to share my 
happy and sad relationship moments with my best friends. I chose to be 
gay because I want to be not able to bring my bf home and let him meet 
my parents. I chose to be gay because I refuse to have the right to have a 
family of my own. I chose to be gay because I don’t want to be able to have 
kids. I chose to be gay because I want to risk losing my job when they find 
out about me. I chose to be gay because I don’t want to be equal to others. 
Do you understand now why I chose to be gay? Obvious, right?!! 
This post from LGBT United is based on a widely reported event, with the addition of 
commentary which identifies numerous sources of anger, reminding members of the 
community of the oppression they face, as well as expressing anger, though not making 
it clear where that anger should be directed.   
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SCOTUS RULES AGAINST KENTUCKY CLERK IN GAY MARRIAGE 
CASE The Supreme Court on Monday evening denied a Kentucky clerk’s 
request to keep enforcing her “no marriage licenses policy” an attempt to 
avoid issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples while she appeals the 
trial court’s preliminary ruling. Rowan County Clerk Kim Davis will have to 
choose whether to issue marriage licenses, defying her Christian 
conviction, or continue to refuse them, defying a federal judge who could 
pummel her with fines or order that she be hauled off to jail. For Ms. Davis 
to enact her own personal policy is completely unacceptable. She is on her 
fourth marriage, a sinner according to her Bible, yet she’s screaming about 
religious convictions. What a hypocrite! And she doesn't even perform the 
ceremony, only issue a license. What her religious convictions has to do 
with it?? It's not up to her to make policy, it's her role only to enact it! Funny 
how all these "Christians" are preaching and practicing all this hate, eh? If 
Jesus were around today, his response would be most likely, "What the hell 
is wrong with you people!" #SameSexMarriage #MarriageEquality 
#Kentucky #SCOTUS #homophobia #bigotry 
4.4.2. You can’t trust anyone (except us) 
The false media 
As discussed in numerous pieces of research, a common theme in both Russian 
and other propaganda is reducing trust in the media (Howard et al., 2019; Lukito, 2020; 
National Intelligence Council, 2017).  While it is a frequent and widely addressed feature 
of the IRA’s more right-wing-directed groups, it also occurred within the IRA’s attempts 
to impersonate other communities (Bastos & Farkas, 2019; Howard et al., 2019; National 
Intelligence Council, 2017).  In the current study, this anti-media sentiment appeared 
most strongly in United Muslims. 
At times, the aim appeared to be to replace actual media with other, IRA-created 
media, or give highly spun takes on actual news stories (DiResta et al., 2018b).  This 
may also involve taking advantage of real issues that affect the targeted communities, or 
identifying and emphasising well-known existing facts, such as Fox News and their 
negative attitude towards Muslims (Considine, 2017; McCombie et al., 2020; Wills & 
Fecteau, 2016).  Posts also serve to suggest that media is always biased against the 
targeted group, going beyond mere political or ideological bias in the vein of right-wing 
vs. left-wing or liberal vs. conservative.  Instead, within these datasets, the media’s 
perceived attitude was sometimes framed as a deliberate attack upon a community, 
especially the Muslim community.   
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United Muslims frequently referenced the media, and the media’s hostility 
towards Muslims, posting statements such as, “The mainstream media doesn't use good 
examples of Muslims but ONLY negative examples and all of a sudden all Muslims are 
villains and Islam is to blame” and “FoxNews will not show you Muslims unless they are 
speaking about terrorism !!” 
Building distrust of the media may aid in obfuscation, potentially fostering denial 
of current events.  This feeling of being attacked by the media could also support the 
notion of persecution, and thereby increase overall antagonism, distrust, and enmity 
(Heiskanen, 2017; Winter, 2019).  Creating distrust in media could give the IRA greater 
ability to make untrue statements and wild claims, declaring any evidence to the contrary 
to be a lie.  Or, if a supposed event or claim does not appear in the news (due to it 
simply not occurring), they might be able state that the media is deliberately, for reasons 
of ideology and persecution, refusing to show it (Lee & Hosam, 2020; Tong et al., 2020).   
Thus, encouragement of distrust of the media may have the potential to bolster 
belief of persecution or threat, which may suggest the need to defend oneself and one’s 
group (Lee & Hosam, 2020; Schulz et al., 2020).  This may also drive sharing posts from 
the group, widening the spread of the group and increasing legitimacy, spreading 
inaccurate or inflammatory information: allegations of media persecution/bias, or 
incitement to distrust are often accompanied by exhortations to share, with suggestions 
that doing so will help address the harm done against the community, and spread the 
truth (Ngwainmbi, 2019; Tong et al., 2020).  United Muslims encourages followers to act 
as the media themselves, thus spreading the IRA’s disinformation and 
hyperemotionality. For instance, a post states, “Be the media”, and another says, “DONT 
LET THE FALSE MEDIA FOOL YOU ABOUT MUSLIMS ... SHARE IF YOU AGREE !” 
American freedom and democracy is dead! 
Posts in both datasets frequently frame the government, whether federal, state, 
or even municipal, as an agent of repression and persecution.  This portrayal often uses 
real news stories, which are embellished with highly emotional commentary.  There also 
appears to be an effort to foster outright distrust of the government as a whole (Bastos & 
Farkas, 2019; Howard et al., 2019; United States. Congress. Senate. Select Committee 
on Intelligence, 2019b; United States v. Internet Research Agency LLC, 2018).  The rare 
mentions of the government seem to express either anger, or a sense of futility and 
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disillusionment, along with general denigration of America and democracy. Such 
language may serve to inspire an attitude of apathy and helpless cynicism, increasing 
passivity (Howard et al., 2019; United States. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on 
Intelligence, 2019a).  All of this may serve to encourage these communities to feel that 
the government is either their enemy/persecutor, or untouchable, distant, and ineffective 
(DiResta et al., 2018b; Howard et al., 2019; Kim, 2018).   
On LGBT United, a post reads in part: “Our own government allows people like 
this to purchase guns and do this kind of shit! We are in a constant state of terror now! 
This is not the America I want to live in!”.  A post on United Muslims said, “Muslim-
Americans fear U.S. government more than ISIS !!”.  Another stated, “And they are still 
willing to register and deport Muslims ...”.   
Others insisted that the American government itself was responsible for the 
creation of ISIS, and therefore, in a way, responsible for continuing conflation of Muslims 
with terrorism: “Guess who created Terrorism ????? Please share and let the whole 
world see this video! #Hillary #Clinton admits #America created, funded and armed Al 
Qaeda ISIS terrorists ... but everybody is still blamming Muslims!”.  LGBT United posted 
about a genuine news story relating to a potential bill to restrict transgender individuals’ 
bathroom access.  The post ended with the declaration, “The majority of the rest of the 
developed nations are moving forward while we are running back to the mid 1900's! 
American Freedom and Democracy is Dead!” 
Occasionally, these stories around government involve some manner of 
encouraging news, with positive events such as new laws against discrimination.  Even 
these positive stories, however, may have a purpose, either in emphasising that these 
new laws have been necessary (thus again pointing out antagonism towards the group), 
or in creating a greater emotional connection with followers.  Perhaps the positive stories 
or sentiments around the government, rare as they are, might bolster the group’s 
perceived legitimacy, as they celebrate things they assume the real community would 
celebrate.  The positive stories may also serve to encourage sharing and interaction, as 
celebratory individuals rush to share the story with their network, or simply to “like” the 
advancement (DiResta et al., 2018b; Miller, 2019). 
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We are… 
With many posts serving to create a sense of looming, ever-present danger and 
attack, and others showing that there is nowhere to turn and no one to trust, these 
groups then move on to another step: positioning themselves as trustworthy friends.  By 
sharing stories, slogans, experiences of prejudice, and other indications of in-group 
membership, they may encourage followers to see them as community – after all, for 
queer and Muslim individuals, one of the primary uses of social media is to experience 
the safety of community (Bahfen, 2018; Escobar-Viera et al., 2020; Wills & Fecteau, 
2016).   
Some appeals to trust and in-group membership are subtle, with use of terms like 
“we”.  Others offer stories, from sad sagas of discrimination to bits of ‘personal’ 
information, some seemingly designed to suggest that the poster has experienced many 
of the same challenges as potential readers.  This use of a ‘personal’, first-person voice 
is especially common in LGBT United.  Some posts try to claim shared experiences and 
understandings, likely attempting to seem relatable to queer people.  
BEING A FEMININE LESBIAN WHO LIKES FEMININE LESBIANS IS SO 
DIFFICULT. First of, it's almost impossible to tell if they're gay unless you 
straight up ask, (my "gaydar" is sh*t - maybe because it works only for gay 
guys? is there such thing as 'lesbiadar' in the known universe??) and you 
can't tell if they're flirting back or just being a nice girl! 
Some claim experience or witness of prejudice, such as a post in LGBT United that 
says: “One of my best friends was from Texas and ended up homeless when his parents 
found out he was gay”.  Posts also offer affirmation and emotional support, which is 
something many in the queer community, especially youth, may be desperate for 
(Cavalcante, 2019; Liang et al., 2019).  LGBT United posted: 
It’s okay. It may not seem like it right now, but you are going to be fine. I 
know it’s scary, but don’t be afraid. You are who you are, and you should 
love that person, and I don’t want anyone to have to go through many years 
of their life afraid to accept that. 
United Muslims provides slogans refuting the view of Muslims as terrorists, while stating 
solidarity with members of the Muslim community as a whole.  One post states, “We are 
Americans, We are Muslims, We are successful in our society....And no, we are not 
terrorists !”.  Another post reads: “And we too stand with you brother, one country one 
55 
family !!!”.  Some posts reference events or concepts specific to the Muslim community, 
such as Ramadan, saying, “MashaAllah ... May Allah bless you all in this holy month!”.  
There is frequent use of terms such as ‘brother’ or ‘sister’, and ‘family’, encouraging this 
feeling of community.   
All of this seems to work to build a front of legitimacy, but also a defense against 
possible detection.  Beyond that, these posts – juxtaposing supposed evidence of 
community belonging with examples of how the rest of the world is hostile and 
dangerous – seem designed to create trust (DiResta et al., 2018b; Howard et al., 2019).   
4.5. That’s the thing I’m sensitive about! 
Analysis of both the current data and existing academic literature supports the 
possibility that posts within both United Muslims and LGBT United may be designed to 
target, and prompt an emotional reaction from, conservatives, especially white 
conservative evangelical Christians.  The specific emotions and “buttons” these posts 
may be intended to push are targeted in slightly different ways, but overall seem to fit 
well into pre-existing stereotypes or fears about Muslims and queer people, especially in 
terms of a supposed desire to ‘take over’ (Ekman, 2015; Sharma & Nijjar, 2018).   
Generally, these posts may be meant to provide evidence or justification for 
conservatives to feel as if they are under threat.  In a way, this use of supposedly real 
posts from these supposedly real communities fulfills marginalised people’s fear when 
discussing intra-community issues: using in-group statements to ‘prove’ bigots’ points 
(Wills & Fecteau, 2016).   
4.5.1. “Fanatics who worship a book written [by] schmucks”: 
Fulfilling prophecies 
Numerous posts in both datasets feature statements which show a negative view 
towards Christianity or Christians; these posts may have the potential to cause irritation 
or defensiveness in Christians (Todd et al., 2020; Whitehead & Perry, 2015). These are 
a relatively front-facing attack, featuring insult to a religion or ideological group, even 
though the insult is sometimes fairly minor.  These posts may serve to paint the queer 
and Muslim communities as being hostile towards Christianity, fulfilling ingrained fears 
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and expectations, especially amongst evangelical conservative Christians (Belt, 2016; 
Karaman & Christian, 2020; Todd et al., 2020; Winnick, 2019). 
 For example, one of the most frequently re-posted posts in United Muslims 
reads, “Alcohol and pork is against Christian beliefs too but some people just tend to 
ignore the things they don't agree with.”  While to some this might read like a fairly mild 
snipe, it may be perceived by some Christians as an attack on their theology, Biblical 
comprehension, dedication, and presumed moral superiority (Kaufman & Niner, 2019; 
Rahman, 2014; Todd et al., 2020).  In the same vein, a United Muslims post declares, 
“Muslims are maybe the only people who are still trying to keep being modest as all 
prophets of God taught us.”   
Another United Muslims post reads, “Many Non-Muslims and mainly Christians 
sometimes Mock how Muslims pray ... here is the surprise !!”.  Presumably, the post 
originally contained non-textual media, yet even the remaining visible content shows 
potential signs of discord-creation.  It could remind Muslims of the way in which some 
look down upon their religious practices; it could also suggest to conservative Christians 
that Muslims see them as an enemy (Hafez, 2014; Winnick, 2019).   
Other posts in United Muslims state hopes that people will convert to Islam, 
which, while innocuous on its surface, may generate anger and fear within Christians 
(Dahab & Omori, 2018; Gorski, 2017; Sherkat & Lehman, 2018; Whitehead et al., 2018).  
For over a millennia, Western Christian political ideology has placed Islam as a threat, 
the looming invader sworn to defeat Christianity – this provides excuses and 
justifications for Christian violence against Muslim people (Goplen & Plant, 2015; Hafez, 
2020; Karaman & Christian, 2020).  It is an underlying and inculcated belief, an ingrained 
illogical reaction (Goplen & Plant, 2015; Zempi & Chakraborti, 2015).  If an American 
Christian Facebook page said, “I’m praying they become Christian!” few would bat an 
eye; when United Muslims posts, “May Allah swt guide them to Islam”, many Christians 
are likely to take it as an act of aggression (Alimahomed-Wilson, 2020; Hafez, 2020; 
Karaman & Christian, 2020; Kaufman & Niner, 2019). 
LGBT United also directly addressed Christians and Christianity, multiple times.  
Some posts featured a fairly benign or even somewhat positive statement, usually 
revolving around describing God as loving, and stating that current conservative 
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Christians are just misunderstanding or even disappointing God.  For instance, “Jesus 
didn't say a damn thing about gay people. He DID have a lot to say about hypocrites”.   
Again, this is unlikely to be well-received by conservative Christians: it could even be 
counted as a form of blasphemy, to someone who holds the view that queer people are 
in direct opposition to God (Colliver et al., 2019).  
Some LGBT United posts, on the other hand, went for something a bit more 
direct: 
What the hell is wrong with these so called Christians? I would much rather 
stand before my creator, as a gay man, than to be standing before him as 
a judgemental bigot!! Bishop: Satan is staging a ‘homosexual invasion’ to 
steal children We’ve covered plenty of loony Christian ministers and their 
outlandish claims about LGBT people, but Bishop Otis Kenner of Louisiana 
may take first prize. Televangelists often claim hurricanes and other natural 
disasters are God’s wrath for accepting LGBT people. Pope Francis says 
transgender people will be the ‘annihilation of man.’ But Kenner thinks 
we’re leading an invasion force to steal Christian children and turn them 
into agents of Satan to stop God’s “colonization of the earth realm.” 
Wow...all I can say is wow right now. I am completely dumbfounded at this 
one..."stealing" children...how many kids are just sitting their waiting to be 
adopted into a loving home? Who are the people that believe this shit??? 
Weak minded!! That's all I can figure. I bet he takes all their money, too. 
The stupidity of some people boggles my mind. These "Christians" just 
become more & more delusional!! I look forward to the day when stuff like 
this is recognized as the mental illness that it truly is and they get the 
treatment they need! 
Another long screed says: 
What is it with fanatics who worship a book written schmucks? Be kind. 
Don’t harm people. Live and let live!! Texas Republican opposed to school 
trans policy files bill that could out kids A Republican lawmaker in Texas 
has objected to school policies allowing transgender students to have their 
needs addressed without informing their parents of their gender identity if 
the student does not wish for them to know, and has now introduced a bill 
critics say could require teachers to out LGBTQ students or face 
consequences. State Rep. Konni Burton filed Senate Bill 242 this month 
and has said that it merely adds to existing state law, which already 
requires schools to share information with parents regarding their children 
in the areas of academics, behavior, and health. One of my best friends 
was from Texas and ended up homeless when his parents found out he 
was gay... you know, 40% homeless youth are LGBT+ due to rejection by 
family members. Outing them could mean the difference between having a 
home and being homeless! That's why Republicans are just hell-bent on 
division because they want to hurt and divide Americans, and they are so 
rogue and potentially corrupt and they can't do their job correctly cause 
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they only care about themselves and what they want and what their 
supporters want, not what ALL Americans want and they don't care about 
ALL Americans. I would just call for a boycott on the entire Republican 
Party, they need to go and be stopped from hurting our kids and Americans, 
and this nation needs to be a Democratic nation and the haters to go and 
crawl back where they came from, the basement. 
These posts are directly aggressive, blatantly full of anger and packed with insults, 
telling Christians that queer people see them as mentally ill, stupid, and to be stopped.  
Additionally, the latter post implicitly equates Christians (the people who “worship a book 
written [by] schmucks”) with Republicans, while also insulting the Bible, which is viewed 
as sacred.  Many Christians believe that the Bible was literally written by God, who 
divinely inspired the human authors (M. Campbell et al., 2019; Worthen et al., 2017).  
Therefore this post would likely be seen as an astounding affront, an attack on 
something literally holy.   
4.5.2. Sounding the dog-whistle 
Other posts, though in the same vein, do not necessarily directly mention or 
address Christianity or Christians. Instead, these posts have an emphasis on elements - 
items, concepts, issues – which may be likely to evoke strong negative feelings about 
the queer and Muslim communities in groups which are predisposed to view these 
communities with hostility, serving as a ‘dog-whistle’ (Wetts & Willer, 2019).  Dog-
whistles are messages that are heard only by a specific group (like a high-pitched dog 
whistle is audible to dogs, but not to humans), or that are recognised only by those who 
are already aware of its meaning and connections.  Dog-whistles “prime underlying 
attitudes without referring directly to the group in question (e.g., “border security” in 
relation to immigrants)—often in a way that discredits and further disadvantages 
marginalised communities” (Coe & Griffin, 2020, p. 3).    
They also serve as a synecdoche: a particular item that represents a whole, 
embodying a mass of fear and feelings about a group (Crosby, 2014; DeCook, 2018; 
Huntington, 2016).  The repeated mention and emphasis on these specific concepts 
within United Muslims and LGBT United may serve as a dog-whistle, speaking to - and 
stoking – Islamophobic, homophobic, and transphobic hostility in those who already 
have negative feelings towards these communities.    
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“A Muslim identity [is] viewed in opposition culturally, religiously, and 
racially to the West and Christianity” (Karaman & Christian, 2020, p. 3). 
“…by extending legal protections to gays and lesbians, the United States 
was breaking its covenant with the Christian God, who in their view 
despises homosexuality” (Whitehead & Perry, 2015, p. 425) 
Hijabs are a dog-whistle for Islamophobes, in the same way that bathrooms are a dog-
whistle for transphobes and homophobes (Alimahomed-Wilson, 2017; Castle, 2019; 
Chakraborti & Zempi, 2012; Farkas et al., 2018a; Murib, 2020; Williams & Vashi, 2007).  
These are potent, recognisable symbols, easy to rally people around, with a built in, 
excuse or denial of prejudice, via, in both cases, an alleged desire to protect women and 
children from danger and abuse (Alimahomed-Wilson, 2017; Colliver et al., 2019; 
Crosby, 2014; Blumell et al., 2019).   
Hijabs are seen as anti-American and threatening, and reference to them can 
activate and imply the validity of feelings of danger, as well as beliefs that Islam is 
inherently oppressive of women (Alimahomed-Wilson, 2020; Crosby, 2014; Zempi & 
Chakraborti, 2015).  This is especially true for conservative Christians, however, even 
supposedly secular societies, like France and Quebec, have moved against veils 
creating legislation banning or limiting their use (Brayson, 2019; Crosby, 2014; Karaman 
& Christian, 2020).   
Hijabs and other head coverings are the most physically visible symbol of Islam, 
and women who wear hijabs are the members of the Muslim community most frequently 
targeted in Islamophobic hate crimes (Alimahomed-Wilson, 2017; Pew Research Center, 
2017).  Within United Muslims, the dog-whistle of hijabs, and its associated concept, 
modesty, appear 28 times.  A frequently repeated post states, “I think God has ordered 
all mankind with modesty, so what is your problem with the Islamic veil (Hijab) ????”; 
another reads, “Hijab is better for you .... God knows better than all of us”.   
Dog-whistle terms continually appear in United Muslims, possibly a reflection of 
how effective appeals to Islamophobia can be within Western society (Alimahomed-
Wilson, 2017, 2020; Ekman, 2015; Whitehead et al., 2018).  Potentially fear-inducing 
words and phrases like ‘Sharia Law’ and ‘jihad’ also abound, as in frequently repeated 
posts saying, “Jihad is not a declaration of war against others !”, and “Sharia Law is not 
what they tell you in the news...”.   
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In the LGBT United dataset, six posts specifically discussed laws around 
transgender individuals’ access to bathrooms, usually in conjunction with quotes from 
real news articles. Within the dataset, 25 posts were actively in favour of transgender 
rights as a whole.  Posts often mention or respond to so-called ‘bathroom bills’: 
legislation which would force transgender people to use the bathroom which correlates 
to the gender they were assigned at birth (the gender which appears on their initial birth 
certificate) (Murib, 2019; Patel, 2017).   
One post reads, for instance:  
F**king perverts!! They can't have a normal life if they're fantasizing about 
women taking a crap!! CALIFORNIA BALLOT MEASURE TO LIMIT 
TRANSGENDER RESTROOM USE FAILS TO QUALIFY Backers of a 
proposed ballot initiative that sought to require transgender people to use 
the public restrooms that correspond with their biological sex say they have 
failed to qualify the measure for the California ballot. This state with its high 
crime rate and drug cartel doesn't need to worry who's using the bathroom!! 
Such expressions of rage could resonate with members of the queer community who are 
transgender or support transgender rights, increasing solidarity with the page 
(Cavalcante, 2019; Craig & McInroy, 2014).  However, transgender individuals’ use of 
bathrooms is also a dog-whistle issue for many people, a potential source of controversy 
due to vigorous negative reactions from conservative Christians, and often from the 
general public (Blumell et al., 2019; Murib, 2020; Pearce et al., 2020; Todd et al., 2020).  
Transgender people face violence and discrimination throughout much of society, and, 
currently, some of this mistreatment is framed around, and justified by, arguments about 
their right to bathroom access (Bender-Baird, 2016; Patel, 2017). 
 Some scholars see the current political and societal focus on attacking 
transgender rights, particularly around bathrooms, as a purposeful strategic shift.  
Having failed to prevent equal marriage, right-wing politicians and groups may have 
moved to a new battlefield in the fight against queer rights (Minter, 2017; Murib, 2019).  
As activist Laverne Cox said, “[D]on’t be fooled: These bathroom laws aren’t really about 
bathrooms … It’s about the humanity of trans people, about us having the right to exist in 
a public space” (L. Cox, 2017). 
Right-wing focus on the issue of transgender bathroom access is framed with a 
familiar justification: protecting women and children (Blumell et al., 2019; Stone, 2018).  
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Opponents insist that allowing transgender people – especially transgender women – to 
use bathrooms which match their gender will lead to assaults in said bathrooms (Blumell 
et al., 2019; Schilt & Westbrook, 2015).  Though there is no evidence to support the 
fearmongering, these claims, along with the larger public’s lack of positivity towards, or 
widespread knowledge about, transgender people, may “creat[e] the potential for 
feelings of threat, mobilization, and conservative policy” (Castle, 2019, p. 654; Colliver et 
al., 2019).    
Posts in LGBT United frequently mention children.  Such posts, though 
appearing at first to just be banal statements or human-interest stories, may have more 
of a purpose.  LGBT United shares numerous stories of real people – once again 
demonstrating use and appropriation of real queer individuals’ identities – which revolve 
around parental acceptance (or lack thereof) of queer children.  Stories of acceptance 
might be heartwarming for real queer people, or their families and loved ones.  However, 
these same stories might be threatening to conservatives who fear the prospect of their 
own children being queer, or who believe that the queer community is ‘evangelising’ and 
trying to convince children to become queer (Buyantueva, 2018; Gal et al., 2016; Stone, 
2018; Wolff et al., 2012).  The juxtaposition of queer people and children calls back to 
homophobic tropes which insisted that queer people were paedophiles, an association 
Russia relied on when introducing its so-called anti-gay propaganda laws (Buyantueva, 
2018; Schilt & Westbrook, 2015; Wolff et al., 2012). 
One post from LGBT United read, “How is two boys kissing gross? Honestly I 
think this is the most brave thing a young boy can do, kiss a boy and not be scared to...”.  
Another post says, “If watching 2 gay men or 2 lesbians kiss prompts your child to 
express interest in the same sex, the tv didn't make them gay... it made them a little 
more comfortable with being gay!” 
Some posts – many of which feel ‘off’ in the same manner as Bad Imitations, 
failing to sufficiently achieve the right facetious tone – seem to hold the potential to fulfill 
fears that queer people have hostile intentions towards non-queer people (including the 
desire to make straight people gay, or cisgender people transgender) (O’Malley et al., 
2018; Stone, 2018; Whitehead & Perry, 2015).  Homophobia and transphobia often 
correlate with ideas that non-queer individuals will somehow lose their rights; some 
posts seem to provide supposed evidence that the queer community wants that to 
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happen (Suchland, 2018; Todd et al., 2020).  This might serve to increase the feeling 
that non-queer people are under threat, or will be forced to conform to queer identities.   
For instance, an LGBT United post states, “The kids that need foster care come 
from heterosexual families. So I think the straights should be banned from being foster 
parents!”.  This could be seen as a joke; or it could be seen as a genuine intention.  
Another post reads: 
Really hate it when guys use that "I'm a lesbian too." line. Like, are freaking 
serious right now? Cause your stupidity really is showing. You're not a 
lesbian woman, you're a straight man. Get the hell over yourself cuz no 
lesbian in history wants your d*ck. Guys who keep hitting on lesbians, even 
after being told off, stop bragging about your ‘magic power’ to turn lesbian 
straight. So you claim that after you show me your weenie I’m instantly 
change by deciding to like dick? Fat chance buddy, your fantasies have 
nothing to do with reality. And you know what? I’m thinking to treat you with 
your own medicine! So enjoy yourself while you can, soon your not-as-
straight-as-you-think girlfriend’ll dump you ‘cause I’m going to steal her 
from you! #queerhumor #lesbian #bornthisway #sexism #stereotypes” 
Overall, these posts that emphasise known dog-whistle issues may serve to legitimise 
existing prejudices, lend credence to beliefs that are based in stereotypes and stigma, 
evoke and stoke feelings of anger and fear, and act as evidence to support the 
supposed need to view the group as a threat.   
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Chapter 5.  
 
Discussion 
This chapter presents a series of propositions: conclusions that arise from 
consideration of the themes revealed from the data, and the context provided by the 
literature.  These conclusions include a discussion of multi-targeting, a chronicle of the 
IRA’s ‘in real life’ actions and how these impact marginalised groups, and an exploration 
of potential prognostications for future IRA activities.  The chapter closes with a 
description of the unique characteristics of the issues emphasised by the IRA in United 
Muslims and LGBT United.   
5.1. Multi-targeting   
Based upon this analysis, consideration of the IRA’s past and methods, and a 
great deal of scholarly research, some posts in LGBT United and United Muslims may 
have been designed to provoke members of the conservative Christian community – 
especially the white evangelical community – through direct antagonism towards 
Christianity, and repeated deployment of dog-whistles.  These posts in LGBT United and 
United Muslims may act as the fulfillment of prophecies, proof to support an already-
assumed theory: that marginalised communities want to supersede Christianity and 
destroy American values (Ekman, 2015; Glass, 2019; Todd et al., 2020; Whitehead & 
Perry, 2015).  Therefore, marginalised-impersonating groups like LGBT United and 
United Muslims are potentially quite useful in falsely substantiating a threat, and 
enflaming fear and reactionism (Ekman, 2015; Farkas et al., 2018a; Gorski, 2017; Zempi 
& Chakraborti, 2015). 
The IRA learns from history, and it learns what works (National Intelligence 
Council, 2017; United States v. Internet Research Agency LLC, 2018).  Blatantly fulfilling 
violent stereotypes may not be as effective as a more subtle method, as shown by 
Farkas et al. (2018).  Farkas et al. (2018) analysed Muslim-impersonating Facebook 
pages that attempted to stoke hatred and fear of Muslims, immigrants, and refugees in 
Denmark.  While it is unknown if these pages were related to the IRA, some of the same 
strategies described by Farkas et al. (2018) also appear in United Muslims, such as the 
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use of limited Arabic ‘religious’ phrases, mention of dog-whistles such as Sharia Law, 
and overall positioning of Islam as a direct and imminent threat to Christianity.   
However, the tone of the posts differs drastically.  The pages Farkas et al. (2018) 
discuss were loud, virulently hateful, filled with graphic threats of murder, sexual 
violence, and a desire for world domination – messages alleging to be from extremist 
Muslims determined to take over Denmark.  This affected the speed of detection, and 
the rapidity of removal.  People very quickly recognised these over-the-top pages as 
false, and dedicated action swiftly removed them from Facebook (Farkas et al., 2018). 
To be long-lasting, and to achieve other goals like creating and executing events 
and gathering assets, it may simply be more effective to be subtle, rather than posting 
content that outright fulfills the most extreme stereotypes (e.g. declaring that all women 
will be forced to wear burqas, or stating an intent to turn children gay) (Bastos & Farkas, 
2019; Becker, 1949; Farkas & Neumayer, 2020).  More subtle content may appear more 
believable at first glance, and thus be easier to embed within political discourse, and 
harder to detect (Bastos & Farkas, 2019; Becker, 1949).  Such material could potentially 
also appear more credible as a legitimate voice of Muslims or queer people, even to 
more judicious investigators; this material could also, however, carry a dog-whistle 
message designed to provoke fear and hostility in specific audiences (Coe & Griffin, 
2020).  
If the IRA posts to a right-impersonating group, claiming that Muslims want to 
make everyone wear a hijab, they can then use United Muslims to back up that 
assertion.  They can show a screenshot of a post that supposedly comes from a very 
large group of Muslims, which focuses on the hijab.  This provision of supposed 
evidence also relates to the concept of using bait posts to attract high numbers of likes 
and followers, to give more credibility and weight to these groups, and to statements that 
might come from them.  If a group like United Muslims, at which at one point had 
300,000 followers, says something, it looks like this statement is supported and backed 
up by 300,000 Muslims (DiResta et al., 2018b; Howard et al., 2019).  
Within the United States, marginalised groups already face constant hostility and 
violence towards their mere existence (Karaman & Christian, 2020; Patel, 2017; Pew 
Research Center, 2017).  The deployment of dog-whistle issues to trigger intense 
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antagonistic beliefs and appeal to already existing prejudices, along with supposed 
evidence of enmity from these groups to Christians, may be, when combined with 
apparent legitimacy and duration of the group, a useful tool to potentially encourage 
further hostility towards these communities.    
Russia has already had success with similarly subtle strategies within their own 
country, as can be seen in their obfuscated Islamophobia, and the initial creation and 
subsequent intensification of anti-gay laws (Ragozina, 2020; Soboleva & Bakhmetjev, 
2015; Suchland, 2018).  In the United States, and in other Wester nations, it is important 
to recognise that the IRA are very good at seeing what is already there, and using issues 
and hatred that already exist (DiResta et al., 2018b; Howard et al., 2019; National 
Intelligence Council, 2017).  The potential use of subtlety is important in terms of 
detection and research methodology – it demonstrates that community members may be 
incredibly valuable to recognise these impostors (Berger, 2015; Fraser, 2015; Zempi, 
2016). 
It is possible, therefore, that when impersonating a marginalised community, and 
presumably intending their posts to target that same marginalised community, they may 
also intend for these posts to carry dog-whistle messages meant to create hostility 
towards the marginalised group.  While exploring IRA propaganda use of LGBT youth, 
analysing ads for various IRA-controlled groups including LGBT United, T. Jones (2019) 
discussed “double-use”, and described how “these LGBT memes were often later 
disseminated increasingly across 2015-2017 for conservative homophobic American 
‘Bible-belt’ electorates” (p.15).   
In particular, T. Jones (2019) detailed an instance where a single meme was 
purposefully posted in both “LGBT United and US news feeds in conservative areas” (p. 
15).  This meme may have read as celebratory to many people, as it joyously declared 
that the Boy Scouts was now permitting gay adults to become troop leaders; however, to 
other audiences, this same message could serve as a dog-whistle, evoking the very long 
history of homophobic beliefs linking homosexuality to pedophilia (GLAAD, 2016; T. 
Jones, 2019; Soboleva & Bakhmetjev, 2015). 
The current study proposes an alternate, broader term, to acknowledge the 
breadth of the phenomenon and to recognise the potentially deliberate intentions behind 
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creation of this propaganda: multi-targeting.  Here, “multi-targeting” is the term this study 
gives to a specific concept/phenomenon: creation and use of an item of propaganda 
(e.g. a post or a meme, or even an entire Facebook group or persona) for multiple 
purposes, and to target multiple audiences at once.  Each target audience receives a 
different message, and the message intended for the latent target may seek to evoke 
hostility towards the manifest target.  A single item may be created with two (or more) 
very different purposes, and with the intention to influence two (or more) very different 
targets.   
There may be a manifest, or surface-level, obvious target – for instance, if it is 
posted by a group which impersonates Muslims, the initial assumption is that it is 
intended to target Muslims.  Then, there may be a latent, or underlying, less-obvious 
target – for instance, if it is posted by a group which impersonates Muslims, yet it 
contains dog-whistles and provocations that are likely to create a reaction in another 
group, it likely is also intended to target that other group. 
The evidence suggests that multi-targeting may exist throughout the content of 
LGBT United and United Muslims. 
5.2. IRA, IRL 
In an article in the Washington Post, Clinton Watts of the foreign Policy Research 
Institute stated, “[N]ot only did [the IRA] influence how people viewed Russian policy, 
they got people to take physical action. That's unprecedented” (Timberg & Dwoskin, 
2018). The legitimacy, influence, and cachet gained by these false IRA- created 
Facebook groups went far beyond influencing ideology (United States v. Internet 
Research Agency LLC, 2018). LGBT United and United Muslims both, in particular, were 
part of physical action, orchestrated in Russia but occurring in America (Howard et al., 
2019; Seetharaman, 2017; United States. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on 
Intelligence, 2019a). The wielding of the Facebook groups’ position and influence to 
enact physical events may have been done with the hope of creating violence (DiResta 
et al., 2018b; United States v. Internet Research Agency LLC, 2018). 
One activity enacted by the IRA groups was the creation of protests and rallies, 
and in particular what Wilson (2020) called duelling protests.  This involved deliberately 
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arranging for two groups of ‘enemies’ to meet, presumably in hope they would clash 
(Howard et al., 2019; Lister & Sebastian, 2017; Seetharaman, 2017; United States v. 
Internet Research Agency LLC, 2018). The most infamous of these events involved the 
wielding of two separate, and very differently aligned and operated, IRA-created groups.  
The IRA created an event on United Muslims, a rally to save Islamic knowledge, 
taking place on May 21st, 2016.  Another IRA Facebook group, Heart of Texas, which 
was virulently right-wing and Islamophobic, created an event it encouraged its members 
to attend - a competing rally for the same time and place, with the goal to ‘stop 
Islamization of Texas’.  Members of United Muslims were encouraged to bring 
themselves; members of Heart of Texas, however, were encouraged to bring guns 
(DiResta et al., 2018a; Seetharaman, 2017).   
Suddenly, in real life as opposed to online, people were meeting - scared of each 
other, angry, and potentially primed for violence (Seetharaman, 2017; United States. 
Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence, 2019a).  If this attempt had been 
successful, we do not know what might have resulted.  Fortunately, though indeed 
dozens of individuals on both sides showed up at the same place, at the same time, 
some with weapons, no violence occurred beyond verbal confrontations (Fanelli, 2017; 
Glenn, 2018; Lister & Sebastian, 2017; United States. Congress. Senate. Select 
Committee on Intelligence, 2019a).  
This pattern of dueling protests appears to be a popular IRA tactic, a method of 
creating physical intersection between groups that the IRA’s social media pages have 
spent time making angry and afraid (Lukito et al., 2020; Miller, 2019; United States v. 
Internet Research Agency LLC, 2018).  Stoking fear, and potentially creating conflicts, is 
a huge part of the overarching strategy behind the online disinformation campaigns 
worldwide (Bastos & Farkas, 2019; Lukito et al., 2020; United States. Congress. Senate. 
Select Committee on Intelligence, 2019b).  For United Muslims, in particular, these 
events show the ways in which marginalised identities were used to open their 
communities to potential harm and violence.     
The Wall Street Journal reported that “At least 60 rallies, protests and marches 
were publicized or financed” by various IRA-run Facebook groups (Seetharaman, 2017).  
Not all of these events appear to be specifically protest/counter- protest intersections: 
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some may have had other purposes, perhaps aims such as bolstering a group’s 
perceived legitimacy and position (Seetharaman, 2017; United States v. Internet 
Research Agency LLC, 2018). For instance, following the Orlando Pulse shooting, LGBT 
United organized a candlelight vigil (Online LGBT Community Hosts Memorial Rally, 
Vigil for Pulse Victims, 2016; Seetharaman, 2017). Events such as this generated media 
coverage, and community recognition (Seetharaman, 2017). It may have also served to 
give the groups the appearance of legitimacy - proof of their activism.  
Their claims to legitimacy through large numbers of followers, use of group 
conversations and terminology, and finally these events, could all have served to make 
them look like trustworthy members of the community they had impersonated (DiResta 
et al., 2018b; Fraser, 2015; Howard et al., 2019). They used this reputation to reach out 
to real community groups, and real activists and organizations. IRA operatives, posing 
as real American activists, contacted many real American groups, requesting partnership 
for events. In some cases, the groups declined. In other cases, after looking at the 
group’s online profile and assuming legitimacy, they agreed (A. Campbell, 2019; United 
States v. Internet Research Agency LLC, 2018).   
In the 60+ rallies and events the IRA executed, many real Americans 
participated, doing everything from purchasing signs to giving speeches to contacting 
networks and spreading the message (United States v. Internet Research Agency LLC, 
2018). Many people also simply attended. For marginalised people, attending an event 
where another group may unexpectedly show up - potentially primed to hate you, likely 
inflamed with fear and anger, and sometimes wielding guns – seems likely to have the 
potential to be dangerous. The IRA’s deliberate creation of such situations suggests the 
possibility that part of their strategy was to set up marginalised communities not simply 
as equal opposition, but as victims for violence.   
DiResta et al. (2018) showed a meme in the form of an image macro, which was 
once posted to LGBT United.  It reads:  
If any gay/lesbian/transgender teenagers need anyone to talk to I’m here 
and I’ll listen.  I’m not looking for a hook up or anything.  I won’t even give 
out my gender or name.  Times are hard and no one deserves to feel alone 
(p. 40).   
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Messages inviting personal sharing and disclosure may, DiResta et al. (2018) went on to 
suggest, be part of an effort to recruit assets.  By taking advantage of the atmosphere of 
trust and the expectation of social media communities as places of support, the IRA 
could encourage people to divulge personal secrets (Jenzen, 2017; Lucero, 2017).  If 
they so desired, they could use this secret as a tool for blackmail, to get people to do 
what they want (DiResta et al., 2018b).  The queer community may be especially 
vulnerable.  For instance, unfortunately, mere existence can be dangerous for many 
transgender individuals, and some people know they could be hurt or even killed if their 
gender identity was revealed (Bender-Baird, 2016; Patel, 2017). 
As a whole, it is apparent that the actions and impact of both United Muslims and 
LGBT United reach beyond the internet, and beyond simply affecting ideology or voting.  
They attempted to use, position, and potentially endanger marginalised individuals, by 
cultivating and then completely betraying these communities’ trust and desire to do 
good. 
5.3. Enmity: Potential futures 
With understanding of the IRA’s methods, consideration of societal prejudices, 
and knowledge of historical and current leveraging of marginalised identities against 
each other, it may be possible to make predictions.  Looking at present-day conflicts, as 
well as past patterns, suggests potential future sources of deliberate interference and 
attempts to create discord.  These primarily involve playing marginalised groups against 
one another, fragmenting their solidarity, as well as relying on a familiar refrain: 
protecting women and children (Blumell et al., 2019; Stones, 2017; Tamimi Arab & 
Suhonic, 2017).   
5.3.1. Queer vs. Muslim 
Russia is already very familiar with deliberately using a marginalised identity to 
promote an agenda, to make opposition of that identity a rallying point, a part of national 
identity, and an outgroup to unite against (L. Jones, 2016; T. Jones, 2019; Suchland, 
2018).  A marginalised community can even serve as a representation of a looming 
foreign threat (Meyer, 2020; Soboleva & Bakhmetjev, 2015).  They have ably used 
issues such as homophobia to divide, and continue to adeptly control a unique, stealthy 
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Islamophobia (Müller, 2019; Ragozina, 2020; Soboleva & Bakhmetjev, 2015; Suchland, 
2018). 
Research has shown that the wider Western public – including the queer 
community – tend to view Islam as inherently homophobic and Muslims as inherently 
opposed to queer rights (L. Jones, 2016; Meyer, 2020; Rahman, 2014; Rahman & 
Valliani, 2016).  Queer rights are used to justify Islamophobia, anti-immigration 
sentiments, and nationalism, worldwide (Kuruvilla, 2017; Meyer, 2020; Rahman & 
Valliani, 2016; Suchland, 2018; Tamimi Arab & Suhonic, 2017).  On the flip side, 
religious and cultural freedom (more specifically, queer rights as a symbol of Western 
imperialism/colonialism), including Muslim rights, may be used as justification for 
homophobia (Rahman, 2014; Rahman & Valliani, 2016; Suchland, 2018). 
Right-wing political groups often claim Muslims are homophobic, and point to 
Muslims as the main threat facing queer people, when, in reality, American Muslims are 
far more accepting of homosexuality than conservative white evangelicals (Kuruvilla, 
2017; Pew Research Center, 2017).  While the queer community is generally considered 
to be leftist, liberal, and tolerant, the queer community’s attitudes and stereotypes about 
Muslims reflect and reinforce Islamophobic – conservative – beliefs (L. Jones, 2016; 
Meyer, 2020; Rahman & Valliani, 2016; Ramirez et al., 2018).  This speaks to the 
potential for pitting these two groups against each other, and the necessity of instead 
maintaining and truly achieving solidarity, as well as recognising the existence of people 
who belong to both of these communities (Rahman, 2014; Shah, 2016; Tamimi Arab & 
Suhonic, 2017).   
These identities are often weaponised by their common oppressors, including 
politicians, limiting community members’ abilities to actually discuss community issues 
without their words being taken and used to create harm (Rahman & Valliani, 2016; 
Tamimi Arab & Suhonic, 2017).  This positioning erodes the solidarity which should exist 
between these two communities which are under attack (L. Jones, 2016; Kuruvilla, 
2017).  As Suhonic said, “I didn’t realise, at all, just how valuable my identity [as a queer 
Muslim], or my position was to existing political frames” (Tamimi Arab & Suhonic, 2017, 
p. 107).   
71 
Such strategies are most commonly used by right wing conservative politicians, 
and by right wing conservative groups, especially Christian groups (L. Jones, 2016; 
Kuruvilla, 2017; Rahman & Valliani, 2016; Tamimi Arab & Suhonic, 2017).  In the 
present West, use of queer rights to justify Islamophobia is a recurrent strategy (Ekman, 
2015).  Donald Trump, for instance, used the Pulse shooting in Orlando, Florida to argue 
for the Muslim Ban (Kuruvilla, 2017; Meyer, 2020).   
Islamophobia, and general racism, within the Western queer community is a 
large and pressing issue.  The Western queer community tends to view itself as just that: 
Western, and often, specifically, white (El-Tayeb, 2012; L. Jones, 2016).  This creates an 
unwelcoming and unsafe community for racialised queer people, allows vulnerability to 
the potential for being used against other marginalised communities, and, by implicitly 
identifying queer rights with Western exceptionalism and supposed superiority, results in 
queer rights potentially becoming dangerously intertwined with colonialism (El-Tayeb, 
2012; Freude & Vergés Bosch, 2020; Kehl, 2020; Meyer, 2020; Rahman, 2014; Rahman 
& Valliani, 2016).  Rahman (2014), describes this as homocolonialism: “the deployment 
of LGBTIQ rights and visibility to stigmatize non-Western cultures and conversely 
reassert the supremacy of the Western nations and civilization” (pp. 6-7).  One 
community becomes a tool to actively continue the oppression of another.   
5.3.2. Feminists vs. Everyone 
There is also a possibility that another community is especially vulnerable to 
propaganda that centres on Muslims and transgender people: feminists.  People (and 
laws) which discriminate against marginalised groups, especially Muslims and 
transgender people, frequently claim to be motivated by the need to protect women and 
children from assault (Crosby, 2014; Blumell et al., 2019; Stones, 2017).  This 
justification can drive, or at least provide an excuse for, conservatives’ prejudices; it 
could do the same for feminists (Colpean, 2020; Crosby, 2014; C. Jones & Slater, 2020).  
The same alleged cause, protecting women and children, could be wielded to 
enflame prejudice from both conservative Christians and radical feminists.  Recent times 
have seen the surge of TERFs, trans-exclusionary radical feminists (who refer to 
themselves as gender-critical feminists), who are virulently opposed to transgender 
individuals.  Indeed, conservative right wing groups and radical feminist groups have 
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begun working together to fight against transgender rights (Carrera-Fernández & 
DePalma, 2020; C. Jones & Slater, 2020; Zanghellini, 2020).   
Similarly, the societal assumptions and stereotypes about Islam as oppressive 
and Muslim women as oppressed have resulted in Islamophobia from feminists, and the 
imposition of imperial feminism (Colpean, 2020; Crosby, 2014).  Imperial feminism, 
outlined by Amos & Parmar (1984), features imposition of Western (white) ideals of 
feminism upon all women, and “uses Western social and economic systems to judge 
and make pronouncements about how Third World women can become emancipated” 
(p. 7).  Imperial feminism ignores women’s agency, as well as the intersectional nature 
of women’s identities and the context of women’s cultures and experiences (Amos & 
Parmar, 1984; Coloma, 2012; Colpean, 2020). 
Imperial feminism harms the very women it paternalistically claims to defend, and 
white feminists have used the excuse of defending Muslim women’s freedom to support 
racist legislation and restriction of Muslim women’s individual rights (Brayson, 2019; 
Chakraborti & Zempi, 2012; Crosby, 2014).  As stated by Mondon & Winter (2017), “calls 
to ban the hijab, burka or burkini…present themselves as attempts to emancipate 
women from an oppressive patriarchal culture, but really only target and punish women 
with charges and penalties by demonizing a particular garment, without ever considering 
the agency of the bearer” (p. 2167).   
Feminists may be vulnerable to Islamophobic appeals which focus on portraying 
Muslim women as oppressed, and Islam itself as inherently oppressive and therefore 
potentially dangerous (Brayson, 2019; Crosby, 2014; Zempi & Chakraborti, 2015).  This 
could create division between groups which might otherwise work together to support 
one another.   
5.4. Is it still fearmongering when the danger is real? 
When writing posts targeting and impersonating conservatives, the IRA targets, 
inflames, and leverages demonstrably inaccurate beliefs and longstanding prejudices, 
amplifying fear and anger (Badawy et al., 2019; Bastos & Farkas, 2019; DiResta et al., 
2018b; Howard et al., 2019).  While they often used already existing beliefs, stereotypes, 
and hatreds, such as Islamophobia, homophobia, anti-immigration, and racism, they still 
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appeared to need to work to embroider, exaggerate, and even outright generate 
conspiracies (Bastos & Farkas, 2019; Guess et al., 2019; United States. Congress. 
Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence, 2019a).  They had to create – or repeat – 
falsehoods, convincing people of a danger that likely did not exist (Bastos & Farkas, 
2019; DiResta et al., 2018b; Zannettou et al., 2020).  
Their methods in targeting marginalised people appear to have a vital difference, 
which is important to acknowledge, in order to be able to respond to it.  The issues the 
IRA emphasises and uses when targeting marginalised groups are often, at heart, 
legitimate (DiResta et al., 2018a; Howard et al., 2019; Kim, 2018).  Posts and content on 
LGBT United and United Muslims often focus on real events, and experiences these 
marginalised groups already recognise as common (DiResta et al., 2018b; Howard et 
al., 2019; Lukito et al., 2020). To target the right wing, the IRA often makes up 
conspiracies and creates an illusory image of constant threat; to target marginalised 
people, they usually do not need to.   
Labelling posts about these legitimate issues ‘fake news’ risks doing a disservice 
to marginalised communities, for whom these things are in fact true.  A post such as one 
described by DiResta et al (2019), which claims that Obama is an illegal immigrant and 
secret Muslim encouraging people to commit voter fraud, for example, takes advantage 
of existing prejudices (racism, Islamophobia, and anti-immigration) to create a false fear, 
by means of an outright, disprovable lie.  A United Muslims post, on the other hand, 
referring to the 2015 Chapel Hill shooting, implying that white mass shooters are rarely 
labelled terrorists, but Muslims regularly are labelled terrorists … well, that’s a fair point, 
demonstrably provable, addressing the reality of Western Islamophobia, which is an 
ever-present danger to Muslims’ everyday lives (Alimahomed-Wilson, 2017; Elmasry & 
El-Nawawy, 2020; Neff & Dewan, 2019; Pew Research Center, 2017).  It is a legitimate 
fear, and an ongoing injustice.   
In the same way, queer people face homophobia and transphobia, and, while 
some of the IRA’s posts may be dramatically phrased, concerns about facing violence, 
discrimination, or even death are, unfortunately, once again legitimate (Belknap, 2015; 
Patel, 2017).  LGBT United discussed the Pulse shooting, transphobic assaults, queer 
individual’s stories of being disowned by their parents – these are likely to be topics and 
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events that queer people are intimately aware of (Cavalcante, 2019; Jenzen & Karl, 
2014; Lucero, 2017; Meyer, 2020).   
That is the big point: for marginalised groups, the fears the IRA touts are not 
illogical.  Therefore, when it comes to marginalised communities, it seems likely that 
fighting disinformation may have difficulty succeeding if undertaken using the same 
methods deployed elsewhere.  For instance, campaigns against disinformation often 
encourage people to “check the facts” – in marginalised communities, people are likely 
to find that these facts are quite accurate (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017).   
Information campaigns face another serious problem: why should marginalised 
groups believe it?  The IRA is already focused on breeding distrust of media, and the 
right wing is prone to disbelieving scientists and those they deem elites, and full of 
conspiracy theories (DiResta et al., 2018b; Lukito, 2020; Simpson & Rios, 2019; United 
States v. Internet Research Agency LLC, 2018).  However, the left wing’s distrust of 
media may also be due to legitimate harm the media has committed, and prejudices and 
stereotypes the media continues to perpetuate (Ekman, 2015; von Sikorski et al., 2017).  
For instance, when Muslims United exclaimed, “You’ll never see this on Fox News!”, 
such a statement is probably true – Fox News is recognised as unlikely to provide 
positive comments about Muslims (Winnick, 2019).  
Marginalised groups also may feel they have good reason to distrust the 
government, as well as academics: both have a long history of mistreating and 
misrepresenting these communities (Ball, 2016; Finefter-Rosenbluh, 2017; Zempi, 
2016).  So, within marginalised communities, campaigns to combat political interference 
may be more likely to be successful when coming from people they can trust: members 
of their community.  However, this also indicates a larger issue, in terms of the need to 
not only seek to correct disinformation, but to reconceptualize responses to foreign 
interference efforts within marginalised communities.  Successfully combatting the IRA’s 
influence within marginalised communities will require different approaches, and different 
methods.  Recommendations to address these issues, and suggestions to improve 
effectiveness, will be discussed in the following chapter.   
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Chapter 6.  
 
Conclusion: Policy Recommendations and Future 
Research 
This chapter briefly details the overarching content and use of marginalised 
identities in LGBT United and United Muslims, as well as the messages this content 
contained.  Subsequently, the chapter addresses limitations of the current study.  
Discussion then moves to recommendations for future research and policy, including 
analytical methods, creating community partnerships, taking away the IRA’s 
‘ammunition’ (via working to decrease the prejudice and violence that marginalised 
communities frequently face), proactively identifying potential targets and tools, and 
overall broadening the use of theory, perspective, and scope.  The chapter ends by 
addressing the marginalised communities themselves, with suggestions to maintain 
solidarity and safety.   
The IRA appropriated queer and Muslim identities to deploy impersonated 
propaganda through LGBT United and United Muslims.  By impersonating these 
communities, the IRA claimed legitimacy in order to emphasise feelings of anger and 
fear, not just in the marginalised communities whose identities they wore, but potentially 
also in those who view these communities as a threat (DiResta et al., 2018b; Farkas & 
Bastos, 2018; Howard et al., 2019).  Specifically, both apparent fulfilling of prejudiced 
beliefs and repeated focus on dog-whistle topics may have been intended to build anger 
in conservatives, especially conservative evangelical Christians (Gorski, 2017; Kanamori 
et al., 2017; Wolff et al., 2012).   
LGBT United and United Muslims emphasised the danger queer and Muslim 
people face, while also potentially creating greater danger by encouraging hostility 
against them. The IRA created feelings of isolation and distrust towards the wider 
community, as well as the government and media, while positioning themselves as 
trustworthy members of a safe space, opening the door for use of community members 
as assets. The IRA used impersonated propaganda to create political passivity within 
marginalised groups, and to encourage their feelings of vulnerability and fear; however, 
it may also have wished to create targets for violence. 
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These marginalised identities were essential, as the IRA appeared to make 
strategic use of existing prejudices in order to manipulate American democracy and 
potentially foment violence (Kim et al., 2018; United States. Congress. Senate. Select 
Committee on Intelligence, 2019a; United States v. Internet Research Agency LLC, 
2018).  Marginalised groups which already face prejudices are being exploited for 
labour, content, and real-world activity, with purposeful invasion of their communities, 
both online and in the real world.  The IRA took advantage of a source of marginalised 
power – community, solidarity, activism, and coming together to have a voice and create 
change (Buyantueva, 2018; Jenzen, 2017; United States v. Internet Research Agency 
LLC, 2018; Yukich, 2018). Their altruism and action are used against them, placing them 
in danger. 
6.1. Limitations 
It is possible that the IRA is not deliberately emphasising dog-whistle topics, or 
purposefully appealing to white evangelical Christian prejudices and fears.  The IRA may 
simply believe this is really how queer and Muslim people act, and their belief in 
stereotypes and emphasis on dog-whistle issues is unintentional, a product of ignorance 
and prejudice.    
I believe this is rendered unlikely when considering the evidence of use of these 
same dog-whistles in right-impersonating groups, and, as discovered by T. Jones 
(2019), by deliberate use of queer-impersonating ads to target and evoke reactions in 
right-wing users.  It seems likely that Russian intelligence, including the IRA, has 
experience in mobilising fear and fulfilling stereotypes to stoke feelings of threat, as seen 
in Ragozina’s (2020) discussion of representation of Muslims in state media, and T. 
Jones’ (2019) discussion of double use of LGBT youth in propaganda, as well as 
Soboleva & Bakhmetjev's (2015) discussion of queer Russians’ awareness of how their 
identity is used for political purposes.  
An obvious limitation exists in relation to identity and experiential knowledge. I 
am a member of the queer community, and therefore had unique insight and 
appreciation, which aided my analysis and interpretation of LGBT United (Berger, 2015; 
Zempi, 2016).  However, I am not a member of the Muslim community, and though I 
have sought to thoroughly ground myself in research, and supported my knowledge with 
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intense use of literature, my analysis of United Muslims is likely to be more superficial 
than one performed by a Muslim researcher (Hayfield & Huxley, 2015; Zempi, 2016). It 
would be incredibly valuable to have more insider researchers, not only to look at the 
United Muslims group and data set, but throughout research into this information, 
including at the government level, and within research as a whole.  
Lack of research on what Facebook groups for marginalised communities usually 
look like necessitates some statements that are basically “trust me”. That is, I have had 
to use my experiential knowledge: for instance, knowing that the use of the term “whore” 
would not be acceptable within the space of an online queer community.  In this case, I 
have attempted to support the trustworthiness of my research, and my own bona fides.  
This involved demonstrating extensive personal knowledge of the community, along with 
strong general use of literature and research whenever possible, while showing diligence 
both in consideration of existing academic research and the methodological rigour 
employed in this study itself. I believe that this support for my credibility and 
knowledgebase suggests that my insights into queer online communities are trustworthy: 
you can probably believe that “whore” is indeed largely not accepted.    
The datasets themselves - and their scope - present limitations, as they do not 
include all of the original context and (often non-textual) content, which may limit 
analysis (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005; Saldana, 2011). This applies to the lack of preserved 
comments, as well, which might have provided insight into reaction to posts, and 
therefore into the purpose of said posts, as well as the success in creating dissent and 
engagement. Additionally, it might have given insight into what type of users were 
successfully ‘taken in’ by these groups.    
6.2. Recommendations 
6.2.1. Analytical methods  
Internationally, governments are seeking answers, information, and strategies to 
combat online disinformation campaigns by foreign actors, Russian and otherwise 
(Bader, 2019; Rodriguez, 2019). This is especially true as the IRA continues its 
activities, by networking, sophisticating, and further embedding themselves into online 
communities. Nations with upcoming elections are especially wary, though - as 
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demonstrated by the current study - electoral interference is only one facet of this issue 
(DiResta et al., 2018a; Howard et al., 2019).  
While analysis of previous IRA activity can reveal valuable insights, it is also wise 
to be actively exploring and looking for current activity.  Many recommendations for 
detection and response have suggested use of Artificial Intelligence.  While this is likely 
to prove useful, it has limitations, especially if it is not capable of analysing images 
(Hacker et al., 2018; Zannettou et al., 2020). This emphasizes the need to employ 
people for detection and analysis, to become familiar with what IRA activity looks like, to 
look through new and controversial hashtags, glance at community groups, and 
generally use the pattern-recognition ability and experiential knowledge humans possess 
(Barbour, 2014; Saldana, 2011).  
Future analysis should involve insiders - researchers with insight and experience 
as part of the community is concerned - and continuing use of qualitative methods 
(Hayfield & Huxley, 2015; Zempi, 2016). Insider researchers are valuable in order to see 
nuances.  Members of the communities are likely to have the degree of knowledge best 
situated to recognize uncharacteristic sentiments, suspicious events, and questionable 
actions and actors.  
The findings of this study may be useful in combatting not just the IRA, but other 
propaganda, and other attempts to influence (or radicalise).  The methods the IRA uses 
are not unique, and the divisions they target, and the prejudices they take advantage of, 
are there for other groups to exploit as well (DeCook, 2018; Farkas et al., 2018a; Jowett 
& O’Donnell, 2012).  Political interference by the IRA is recognised as a pressing threat 
to democracy and safety worldwide, yet other groups, foreign and homegrown, employ 
similar methods, and also pose a danger, especially to the marginalised communities 
they often frame as the enemy (DeCook, 2018; Johnson, 2018; Meyer, 2020).   
It is also wise to be aware of the potential for multi-targeting.  As efforts to stop 
the IRA continue, and improve, it is likely that their efforts – and the efforts of other 
groups who may wish to influence the public and create discord – will also continue and 
improve, becoming more sophisticated and sneaky (Badawy et al., 2018; DiResta et al., 
2018b; Kim, 2018; Lukito, 2020).  Multi-target propaganda may be a method they use to 
evade detection and deletion, especially as social media companies have been put 
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under increasing pressure to identify and remove blatant hate speech and ‘fake news’ 
(Acker & Donovan, 2019; Farkas & Neumayer, 2020; Hindman & Barash, 2018). Future 
research should explore the use of dog-whistles (and also simply discover what various 
dog-whistles there are), and undertake more in-depth analysis of the use of 
marginalised-impersonating propaganda in general, but also specifically the use of 
marginalised-impersonating propaganda to target right-wing audiences.   
6.2.2. Community partnership 
DiResta et al. (2018) state, “…we must promote a multi-stakeholder model in 
which researchers, tech platforms, and government work together to detect foreign 
influence operations” (pp. 100-101).  Here, members of the marginalised communities 
being impersonated are not considered ‘stakeholders’, despite being at such risk, having 
their identities and voices coopted and spaces invaded, and despite their invaluable 
insider knowledge (Finefter-Rosenbluh, 2017; Zempi, 2016). Authorities must treat these 
groups as partners.  These communities are the people being victimized and targeted.   
As an example, during the period shortly after the beginning of the 2020’s 
worldwide Black Lives Matter protests in response to the police killings of George Floyd 
and Breonna Taylor, a tweet circulated from an account claiming to represent 
Vancouver’s chapter of Black Lives Matter. The tweet advertised and encouraged 
attendance at a protest in Vancouver. Also circulating, shortly thereafter, were tweets, 
from personal accounts of individuals associated with the actual Black Lives Matter 
Vancouver group - a group that has been active for several years, and involved in 
several protests during that time. The second series of messages warned that the long-
existing Vancouver chapter of Black Lives Matter had not created this post, or this 
protest, and advised people to be wary.  Eventually, a consensus was reached: that, 
while not organised by Black Lives Matter Vancouver, the protest appeared to have 
been genuinely created by a community activist, and therefore it was endorsed (with 
caution) (Black Lives Matter Vancouver, 2020).   
The suspicious nature of the incident was identified by community members, who 
also recognised the potential for danger and investigated the issue via their personal 
networks, ensuring safety for the rest of their community.  Members of the targeted and 
impersonated communities should be recognized as sources of invaluable information, 
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instinct, and analytical ability (Berger, 2015; Zempi, 2016). Suspected impersonated 
propaganda of marginalised communities should be analyzed by people who can delve 
into, and not buy into, stereotypes, and recognize bad imitations.  
Community expertise could be built into existing frameworks.  For instance, many 
social media companies have implemented a feature allowing users to report suspected 
disinformation or suspicious activity.  Nonetheless, so far, social media platforms’ efforts 
to combat influence campaigns have had mixed results; communities’ abilities to 
recognise suspicious impersonations could be a useful tool, if their reports were given 
weight (Allcott et al., 2019; Hindman & Barash, 2018). 
Partnership can extend to addressing IRA propaganda within marginalised 
communities.  As has been discussed, marginalised communities are likely to distrust 
government, media, and academics: information coming from these sources is likely to 
have limited effect (Bruckert, 2014).  However, information coming from fellow 
community members may be more likely to successfully correct disinformation, spread 
information, and warn about potential dangers.  It is vital to approach these communities, 
develop relationships with respected members and organisations within them, and work 
with them to use the inbuilt mechanisms of trust, relationship, and interpersonal 
connections that these communities already operate upon (Jenzen, 2017; Lozano-Neira 
& Marchbank, 2016).   
6.2.3. Take away their ammunition 
The Internet Research Agency sought to create polarisation, utilizing a focus on 
specific wedge issues and focal points of controversy (DiResta et al., 2018b; Kim, 2018; 
Lukito, 2020). They stoke feelings of enmity between left and right, and between various 
communities, but also between these communities and the government (National 
Intelligence Council, 2017; United States. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on 
Intelligence, 2019a). This emphasis on key issues is a major tactic, potentially a means 
of harnessing marginalised communities’ legitimate fear, anger, distress, and 
experiences of oppression. 
Therefore, it would seem reasonable that an effective way to hamper Internet 
Research Agency activities is to stop giving them material to work with.  Police brutality, 
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Islamophobia, transphobic and homophobic discrimination: if government and other 
agencies act to make these big issues much smaller issues, and decrease oppression of 
these communities, the IRA may not have such an easy tool at hand (DiResta et al., 
2018b; Howard et al., 2019). Governments could potentially lessen the success of IRA 
propaganda that focuses on marginalised groups’ experiences of discrimination and 
injustice by reducing discrimination and injustice.  A tall order, certainly, but an action 
both logical and moral.  
This also speaks to the need to delve deeper into the reasons why the IRA has 
been effective, why their messaging has been successful, and who has the responsibility 
– and best chance – to challenge this effectiveness.  When so much of the IRA’s 
activities deliberately take advantage of prejudices that already exist within society, it 
seems logical that society itself (in the form of governments, researchers, and other 
authorities) must take some action.  Discouraging the spread of IRA propaganda online 
(e.g. by recognising their presence on social media, and by hopefully having social 
media companies take down their posts) should only be one part of the overall response, 
and social media companies themselves should only be one of many parties addressing 
the issue.  
6.2.4. Identify emerging targets and tools 
Researchers and authorities alike need to be proactive, not reactive.  It would be 
wise to begin searching for emerging areas of division and aggression, which could be 
evidence of IRA involvement, or merely give us an idea of potential future themes they 
will target.  This may allow us to have an idea where to look for influence campaigns and 
disinformation; many emerging enmities or even conspiracies can be potentially tracked 
down to their places of origin.  For example, in regard to the recent upswing in radical 
feminist hostility to transgender individuals, it may be worthwhile to trace some of the 
origins and history of the build up to this state of affairs, such as looking at a forum, 
Mumsnet, which is a frequent hotbed of anti-transgender discussion (Carrera-Fernández 
& DePalma, 2020; C. Jones & Slater, 2020; Pearce et al., 2020).   
Consideration of potential areas of discord, or merely of oppression and 
vulnerability, might suggest communities the IRA may see as useful, and issues they 
may choose to exploit.  It would likely be beneficial to be aware of marginalised groups, 
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considering the possibility that these communities could become the purposeful target of 
increasing hate and violence due to incitement of hostility and fear by the Internet 
Research Agency (Bastos & Farkas, 2019; Gorski, 2017).   
For instance, this study has previously mentioned the theme of protecting women 
and children, to which many prejudices and moral panics appeal (Hines, 2020; Pearce et 
al., 2020).  What are moral panics or divisive issues of today, especially those that insist 
they are for the purpose of protecting women and children, and that have negative 
impact on a marginalised group?  Especially a marginalised group already known to be 
viewed as dangerous or inappropriate by conservative Christians?  A few issues already 
come to mind, such as the recent increase in fear of - and intense misunderstanding of - 
human trafficking, as well as concurrent hostility against sex work (Durisin et al., 2018; 
Millar & O’Doherty, 2020; O’Doherty et al., 2018).  To go along with this, what are some 
‘dog-whistles’ associated with these issues, that might appear in multi-targeting 
propaganda?  Recognising patterns in the past divisive issues the IRA has used might 
help in identifying, and potentially countering, future actions.   
6.2.5. Theory, perspective, and scope 
Governments and academics would also potentially benefit from widening the 
scope of their analysis, to move beyond looking at disinformation campaigns and 
computational warfare, as just propaganda.  Instead, it may be beneficial to begin 
examining these campaigns through frameworks and theoretical lenses of recruitment 
and incitement to extremism and radicalization (Johnson, 2018; Winter, 2019). It may 
also be of benefit to begin investigating desistance from IRA-promoted beliefs and 
conspiracies in those who are radicalized through these groups, to apply techniques 
previously found useful in desistance (Benkler et al., 2018).  
As demonstrated in the current study, thorough consideration of historical, 
sociological, and cultural context can create new realms of insight (Dwyer & Buckle, 
2009; Saldana, 2011).  Discussion of current disinformation campaigns would benefit 
from more in-depth exploration and incorporation of the nuances revealed by looking at 
the historical development and cultural situation of issues, groups, enmities, and even 
propaganda methods. 
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It may also be useful to take a closer look at a particular community, considering 
the IRA appears to target its specific prejudices, beliefs, history, and tendencies: white 
evangelical Christians.  While white evangelical Christians are known to have very high 
levels of hostility towards many marginalised groups, they often appear to be lumped in 
with the general ‘right-wing’ when it comes to the IRA, which may be a failure to 
recognise their political influence and potential importance in foreign influence 
operations – especially as targets of propaganda that increases hostility towards 
marginalised communities (Glass, 2019; Gorski, 2017; Johnston, 2016).  It would be of 
particular benefit to examine the process of ‘deradicalisation’ from such prejudices and 
hostile beliefs (and even from right-wing extremism), specifically in those who are, or 
were, white evangelical Christians.  Insights could subsequently be applied to more 
effectively fight against attempts to incite extremism within this population.   
Overall, it seems essential that researchers and governments alike question 
some of their assumptions about what will be most effective to combat foreign influence, 
disinformation, and propaganda on social media.  In general, those attempting to combat 
online political interference should consider tailoring response strategies, as opposed to 
enacting ‘one size fits all’ solutions.  Response strategies should be implemented based 
upon consideration of the nature of the communities targeted, the issues leveraged, the 
emotions elicited, and the actions it might be intended to instigate.    
Recognition of historical and societal context, and the ways in which the IRA’s 
propaganda appeals to highly ingrained prejudices and beliefs, suggest that we must 
widen our focus from simple correction of disinformation or deletion of ‘fake news’.  We 
must look to our society, and the prejudices within it.  In addition, we must look to 
emotion.  Logic, and insistence that people believe what authorities, may have limited 
effect, especially if built-in ways to deny such statements exist (such as distrust of media 
and government, acceptance of conspiracies, religiously-ingrained resistance to 
contradictions of existing beliefs, et cetera) (Dahab & Omori, 2018; Glass, 2019; Gorski, 
2017; Ladd, 2010; Vilaythong T. et al., 2010).  Emotion may be an effective tactic to 
explore: activating compassion, challenging stereotypical beliefs by providing in-person 
evidence of their falseness, encouraging empathy and personal connection with 
communities people may have been taught to hate, and creating more positive and 
genuine representations of marginalised people (Broockman & Kalla, 2016; Flores et al., 
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2018; Johnston, 2016; Kalla & Broockman, 2020; Mizock et al., 2017; Moritz et al., 
2017). 
6.2.6. The communities: Solidarity and safety 
The Internet Research Agency is not just creating, and targeting, online 
communities and groups. They are also targeting real life groups and activists, and 
taking actions that affect them in physical space, such as creating potentially-dangerous 
rallies (Seetharaman, 2017; Timberg & Dwoskin, 2018).  Marginalised communities as a 
whole, and especially community groups need to take actions to protect themselves, 
both physically and from efforts to weaponise groups against each other.  This requires 
deliberate action to promote solidarity and safety. 
Communities should recognise and emphasise the need for solidarity, especially 
between the queer and Muslim communities (L. Jones, 2016; Kuruvilla, 2017).  The 
queer community, in particular, must challenge both internalised Islamophobia and 
stereotypical beliefs, as well as beginning to grapple more directly with homocolonialism 
and imperial feminism (Meyer, 2020; Rahman, 2014; Toor, 2012) 
Groups should be wary of new individuals and contacts, taking care to check 
credentials, not just online but through personal connections.  If these people – or 
groups – have a social media presence, it would be wise to take a close look, checking 
for unusual or unusually inflammatory statements, especially those focusing on 
fomenting intra-group division.  Trust your gut when something feels “off”.  Even if the 
organisation or group has a good reputation, it is advisable to be cautious and check to 
see that it is not a stolen identity being re-used by a different group.  Be suspicious.   
It would also benefit communities for trusted groups and individuals to spread 
awareness, and warn others about the methods these impersonators use, and the 
dangers the communities face.  Encourage people to be cautious, especially if they are 
approached and asked to perform a task, and to be very careful before disclosing 
personal information that could result in harm if it were revealed. 
Above all, groups, communities, and activists should take special care around in-
person rallies, protests, and events.  This is not to say communities should stop 
protesting: activism is necessary, especially in the current world.  However, make sure 
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that the people or groups organising the events are legitimate and well-known, that the 
contacts are known by personal connections, and beware of counter-protests by 
potentially violent groups.  Unfortunately, once again, marginalised communities are 
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